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This thesis analyzes the rise of paramilitary organizations in Germany from the end of the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1871, through World War I, into the Weimar Republic, and 
finally in the Third Reich. The crisis of domestic politics as well as the Treaty of 
Versailles played an important role in this expansion. These factors limited Germany’s 
military force and opened the door for military desperados to control the security of the 
nation.  
Paramilitary organizations grew throughout the interwar period, eventually 
growing into major political forces, most notably the Sturmabteilung (SA) of the Nazi 
Party. As the Nazi Party gained power, the SA, and later the Schutzstaffel (SS), occupied 
an important role within the totalitarian state. As the violent arm of the party, the SA and 
SS carried out the will of Adolf Hitler, whether running concentration camps or entering 
combat in World War II. 
By the end of World War II, paramilitary organizations proved to play an 
important role in Germany’s history, especially for the rise of Hitler and the atrocities of 
the war. The purpose of this thesis is to show the effects that mass politics, military 
professionalism gone wrong and war termination can have on a nation and how this can 
spiral out of control as it did in the case of Germany. 
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A. QUESTIONS TO ANSWER 
Paramilitary organizations have played an important role in the civil-military and 
political relationship in Germany in the pivotal period from 1871 until 1989 when one 
includes the extension of these themes in the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany). The focus of this study, however, is on the epoch until 1945, wherein such 
paramilitary organizations in central Europe formed a significant and generally 
destructive feature of mass politics and military organization. From the creation of the 
German Empire under Emperor Wilhelm II, through the Great War, subsequent 
transformation into the Weimar Republic, and finally the rise of National Socialism and 
the Second World War, paramilitary organizations transformed the political landscape of 
the German state and eventually the face of Europe. A view of these national experiences 
expands the understanding of paramilitary organizations and civil military relations and 
as the relationship of the soldier to mass politics in the European past and present. Such 
an examination is not without relevance at a time when, in the year 2014, such 
paramilitary or party militia organizations associated with extreme nationalist political 
parties have reappeared in Europe in crisis.  
In this connection, several sub questions to the central issue emerge. How did 
these organizations shape the German and Austrian nations over the course of three 
governments from the late nineteenth century until 1945? What impact did World War I 
have on the foundation and expansion of such paramilitary organizations, and how did 
that influence the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime in 1933? How did the veterans 
organizations following the Franco-Prussian War by whatever means evolve into the 
Freikorps, Sturmabteilung (SA), Schutzstaffel (SS), and the other paramilitary groups of 
the Weimar Republic and Third Reich?  
B. RELEVANCE TODAY 
Although much research exists with regard to Germany’s history, particularly in 
the inter-war period of 1919–1939, a comprehensive look at the paramilitary history from 
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post-Franco-Prussian War to World War II is necessary as an examination of civil 
military relations in central Europe and as a means to understand mass politics and the 
role of soldiers in them. Much of the research has focused on Hitler and his role in the 
rise of fascism and German aggression in the 1930s. The paramilitary aspect in his career 
and those around him has played a key role and should be explored especially by those 
interested in civil military relations and security affairs in Europe in a general sense. 
While some authors have focused on paramilitary organizations, most are limited to a 
particular group or a specific epoch. This thesis aims to bridge the gap between the 
different groups and eras with generalizations and an overview.  
A look into the underlying roles and missions, esprit de corps, and collective 
biographies behind the rise in paramilitary organizations in Germany, namely the Treaty 
of Versailles provides a place for pause in war termination planning and the need to 
disarm irregular paramilitary units in post conflict reconstruction, a contemporary issue 
of no small import. The effects of the victors’ decisions can have greater consequences 
than intended, and the rise of the Nazi party and ability to stay in power is a potential 
example. Poorly understood in general staffs and defense think tanks are the 
demobilization of defeated but also politically radicalized soldiers and the impact of the 
same on mass politics in a post conflict environment. The Iraqi episode as well as others 
begs the question of what happens when a state and its army collapse, and how do these 
entities adjust and regroup, especially in political turbulence. Knowledge of how these 
forces operated in the past offers a good basis for reflection, analysis, and even planning. 
Especially relevant in today’s world is the drawdown of over a decade of constant 
conflict and subsequent reduction in military forces around the world. A reduction in 
force in the worst possible circumstances occurred in Germany in the late nineteenth 
century, as well as after World War I. This led to the rise in paramilitary organizations 
comprised of returning soldiers. While the present does not easily resemble post war 
Central Europe in 1919, a study of the self-image, ethos, and the reasoning behind the 
paramilitary problems, both social and economic, offers the regional specialist a needed 
field of inquiry against the most serious ruptures of civil military relations, crises of 
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democratic government, and the forces of nationalism and militaristic desperation that 
have given rise to war in the past and might do so in the future.  
C. SCHOLARSHIP ON PARAMILITARIES IN GERMANY 
The literature on paramilitary organizations throughout German history is 
widespread, with more available for the post-World War II, Third Reich Germany, and 
far less for the pre-1918 German Empire. James M. Diehl’s Paramilitary Politics in 
Weimar Germany provides a comprehensive review of the rise of paramilitary 
organizations and the role these groups played in the eventual fall of the Republic. His 
idea that block-building (Blockbildungen) was a link between the German Empire and the 
Weimar Republic, and it was the militarization of these militant groups in the Weimar 
Republic that led to the removal of the monopoly on violence by the Reichswehr and 
opened the door for the paramilitary groups to fill this void.1 Furthermore, Diehl shows 
that the increasing role of paramilitary groups in the Republic allowed the National 
Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) to rise to power.  
Diehl also published an article in the Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, outlining the 
organization on veterans groups in Germany from 1917–1919. “The Organization of 
German Veterans, 1917–1919” explains how initially the groups were in stark opposition 
to the Social Democrats due to the anti-monarchists views of the democrats. The 
Kriegervereine was started prior to World War I after the Franco-German War in 1870–
1871, but grew in size and influence after the influx of returning veterans from World 
War I. Diehl attributes the increasing power of the Kriegervereine to the inclusion of 
Social Democrats during World War I.2 His article is a great look at the transformation of 
the Kriegervereine from a non-political group, into a champion for social and economic 
welfare for veterans, to a political organization in opposition to the Reichsbund, the 
Social Democrat’s veterans organization.  
                                                 
1 James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1977), 4, 18.  
2 James M. Diehl, “The Organization of German Veterans, 1917–1919,” Archiv Für Sozialgeschichte 
11 (1971), 146, http://library.fes.de/jportal/receive/jportal_jparticle_00012833.  
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Peter H Merkel’s The Making of a Stormtrooper examines why Germans joined 
the paramilitary groups during the end of the Weimar Republic and throughout the Third 
Reich. A look into initial reasoning behind the massive increase in Sturmabteilung (SA) 
and Schutzstaffel (SS) members led Merkel to determine that the depression in the 1920s 
was a deciding factor.3 A change in attitude towards the Nazi paramilitary groups 
occurred once the Nazi Party partnered with the Communist Party (KPD) and secured a 
majority in the Reichstag. Initially, “both the Reichswehr and the Prussian police would 
meet any strong-arm attempt by the NSDAP with armed force.”4 A half a year later, it 
was determined that “the Reichswehr would be physically unable to keep the 
stormtroopers and Communists under control in a state of emergency.”5 The paramilitary 
groups were no longer regulated to underground operations and began to be a violent 
presence throughout Germany. Merkel continues by examining where the NSDAP and 
SA/SS members came from. He concluded that Nazi and stormtrooper members came 
from different social and economic backgrounds, with many being blue collar workers. 
Each group had different motivations to join the Nazi Party, with many stuck between 
social classes, feeling exasperated, detested, and thus more easily recruited.6 After 
Hitler’s imprisonment and release, he set out to ensure all paramilitary groups were under 
NSDAP control. All stormtroopers had to join the NSDAP, and the SA was closely 
controlled. Merkel further expounds the rise of the stormtrooper’s power and the rise of 
Nazism in Germany. He also compares the rise of fascism in many European countries, 
including Austria.  
C. J. Elliott’s article, “The Kriegervereine and the Weimar Republic,” delves into 
the German veteran organizations and the evolution from simple groups designed to 
ensure tradition, comradeship, and welfare for ex-soldiers, into more politicalized and 
                                                 
3 Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 4–
7.  
4 Ibid., 24. 
5 Ibid., 25. 
6 Ibid., 144, 155. 
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militarized units.7 The Kriegervereine were non-political when they were first formed in 
the late eighteenth century, but became increasing political in the nineteenth century. The 
Kyffhäuserbund, the overarching organization of Kriegervereine, was created in 1892, 
which gave the groups a common leader and platform. Prior to World War I, these groups 
were opposed to the SDP and were primarily used in propaganda and recruiting efforts 
for the army.8 It transformed into a highly patriotic and monarchist organization. Elliott 
describes the impact the Treaty of Versailles had on the Kyffhäuserbund, namely that 
they were not allowed to receive weapons or training from the army, although it still 
occurred regularly. He also provides insight into the problems the Kyffhäuserbund faced, 
especially when the local Kriegervereine caused incidents. In the end, Elliott determines 
that the veteran organizations had a political effect due to a lack of government control, 
but this effect could have been greater with more support for monarchism throughout 
Germany.9  
Gordon Craig’s The Politics of the Prussian Army is a comprehensive history of 
the Prussian/German political journey from 1640–1945. Particular importance for this 
thesis is his sections concerning post-World War I Germany. He examines the beginning 
of the Freikorps that developed after the war and gave the returning soldiers an 
opportunity to continue the militaristic jobs they were doing before. The Treaty of 
Versailles plays an important role in Craig’s examination of post-World War I Germany. 
The treaty played a direct role in the uprising of anti-republic sentiment and subsequently 
led to the failed Kapp Putsch of 1920.
10
 Craig’s work also explains the rise and fall of the 
SA. From its rise in power in the 1920s, to the Night of the Long Knives on June 30, 
1934, the SA was the largest paramilitary group and had great political power. The SS 
took its place when Hitler determined that they were too powerful for him to control. 
                                                 
7 C. J. Elliott, “The Kriegervereine and the Weimar Republic,” Journal of Contemporary History 10, 
no. 1 (Jan. 1975), 109–129.  
8 Ibid., 110. 
9 Ibid., 109–29. 
10 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 374–7.  
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Overall, Craig’s book provides a great look into the political transformation in Germany, 
especially during the tumultuous inter-war period.  
Studying an organization that was somewhere between the true paramilitary 
nature of groups like the SA or SS and the professional German Army, David Yelton’s 
Hitler’s Volkssturm: the Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany shows the importance the 
Volkssturm played in the final months of World War II.11 It explains why the militia 
fought with intensity, even though the war was clearly lost from any other point of view 
except from the Nazi lens. It also shows how much the Nazi party trusted the army, 
where they created a militia comprised of those not fit for military service. Yelton’s book 
also expertly examines the relationships between the Volkssturm and other paramilitary 
groups, notably the SA and SS. He shows the increasing power of the Volkssturm may 
point to a decreasing role of the SS.12 Yelton concluded that the Volkssturm failures were 
less the result of it being a militia and more rooted in the hasty and disorganized creation 
of the force.13  
Finally, Peter Fritzsche’s Germans into Nazis traces the evolution of the German 
people from “patriotic enthusiasm to Nazi revolution, from 1914–1933.”14 With regard to 
paramilitary organizations, emphasis is placed on the Freikorps morphing into other 
groups, notably the Stahlhelm and Jungdeutscher Orden, which pushed the Nazi 
message. Fritzsche shows the nationalistic nature of Germans through World War I and 
how this affected the susceptibility of the German people to Nazism after the war. 
Particularly, the returning veterans and those too young to fight were easily brought into 
the Freikorps and Home Guard units, paving the way to Nazism. At the heart of his 
argument is that Germans were patriotic and it was this patriotism that the Nazis 
capitalized on to draw more into their party. The paramilitary groups, specifically the SA 
and SS, played a crucial role in supporting and enforcing party politics.  
                                                 
11 David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, ‘44–’45 
(Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2002), 155.  
12 Ibid., 155–6.  
13 Ibid., 162. 
14 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 9.  
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D. GERMANY: A CHANGING NATION 
Over the course of 74 years from unity until the epoch of total war, Germany went 
through tremendous changes, capped with two World Wars and the greatest case of 
nationalism and mass movement in recent history. What started as groups of veterans 
returning from the Franco-Prussian War transformed into large political fighting forces 
that would push the agenda of leftist and rightist political parties. How were these groups 
able to achieve this level of power? The major shift can be seen following World War I 
and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The connection between the military 
restrictions on Germany following the war and the subsequent rise in power by the 
Freikorps and other paramilitary organizations is clear. The lack of the government to 
control these groups also played into their eventual control of the nation. Evident by the 
multiple putsch attempts by different paramilitary groups, the government was not able to 
maintain order in the tumultuous post-War era.  
The paramilitary organizations adapted to the changes within the Weimar 
Republic, maintaining power, even when they were officially dissolved. They used youth 
organizations to ensure their political agenda would continue in the next generation. By 
the time the Nazis took control in 1933, paramilitary organizations had supplanted the 
German Army as the holder of power. Over the next few chapters, the rise of the 
paramilitary groups will show how the Allies’ demands following the war had a marked 
impact on their success. Also, the change of the paramilitary groups from simple veterans 
groups to the military arms of various political parties can be explained through the 
increased nationalism and anti-Republic sentiment felt throughout the many 
organizations and the youth of Germany.  
It is important to establish the underlying causes of the great number of Germans 
that chose to join paramilitary groups in order to understand how they became political 
forces in Germany. Once these paramilitary groups were established, why were some 
more successful than others? The effect these organizations had on the politics of inter-
war Germany is significant in the study of both the rise of Nazism and of World War II. 
Most importantly, research into the role World War I had on paramilitary membership 
will establish a critical transformation point in German history. 
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Research into the prevalent paramilitary organizations will show that the Allies’ 
military restrictions imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles were critical factors 
in the explosion of membership into these organizations. This would lead to the eventual 
takeover by the Nazis and subsequent terror imposed by Hitler and his SA/SS forces. The 
nature of paramilitary organizations in Germany will be examined and how they played a 




II. ORIGINS OF THE PARAMILTARY SPIRIT 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE FREIKORPS, 1890–1918 
Although the Freikorps units grew and prospered after 1918, the origins of these 
volunteer forces lie in previous events. As Robert Waite describes, two key events shaped 
the populous into being drawn into the paramilitary groups. First, the prewar Youth 
Movement placed the idea of revolt against the bourgeois into the minds of the German 
youth. Second, World War I brought a new type of combat troop, the stormtroopers, 
which would see itself manifested in the Free Corps units of post-war Germany.15 The 
Young German League (Jungdeutchlandbund), founded in 1911, was created by the 
government to provide training to the youth of the Empire. Comprised of over 750,000 
members by the onset of World War I, the Jungdeutchlandbund “was a sort of militarized 
Boy Scouts, providing premilitary training and imparting military and ‘national’ values to 
its young members…and was a significant factor in furthering the militarization of 
German society.”16 This organization set the stage for the future youth organizations in 
post-War Germany.  
B. WORLD WAR I  
1. Stormtroopers 
As World War I became more of a war of attrition rather than a traditional war 
that had been seen previously in history, a new type of soldier as athlete and high tech 
combatant was needed to effectively engage the enemy and break through the lines. The 
stormtrooper fit this role perfectly. Captain Willy Rohr first formed a group of highly 
trained, elite soldiers that would break through the enemy’s lines. These troops had 
special equipment, including flamethrowers, smaller carbines, and steel helmets. The 
stormtrooper would undergo intense training before being put into battle, leading to  
 
                                                 
15 Robert George Leeson Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post-War 
Germany, 1918–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 16, 18, 24–26.  
16 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany, 9–10.  
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immense success. Stormtrooper soldiers were the best German fighters, and as a result, 
held privileges that others in the army did not. For example, they had special uniforms, 
generous leave, and better food and equipment.17  
The leaders of the storm trooper units were young and ambitious, leading to a 
feeling of superiority over the normal army. This feeling was not exclusive to the 
officers; with the poet laureate and literary exponent, Ernst Jünger describing the 
stormtroopers as “the New Man…a completely new race, cunning, strong, and packed 
with purpose,”18 and Franz Schauwecker labeling them as the “Troops of Destiny.”19 
Another key difference between the stormtroop units and the regular army that would 
translate into the paramilitary units in post-war Germany was the officer-enlisted 
relationship that was not hide bound and broke the bonds of society. There was a more 
familiar relationship between the officers and their men, something that was unheard of 
in the regular army. It was based on loyalty rather than fear. This is exemplified in an 
excerpt from W. Hoeppener-Flatow’s Stosstrupp Markmann, where he described the 
relationship between Markmann, a stormtroop officer, and his men. He wrote:  
Markmann knew precisely how he stood with his men. To them he was 
not their commanding officer; he was their Leader! And they were his 
Comrades! They trusted him blindly and would have followed him into 
hell if it were necessary.20  
This was the standard in these units, which would be carried over into the Freikorps units 
in later years. These young officers returned from war with these ideas of how an elite 
military unit should be run and applied the same process when they joined the 
paramilitary groups during the inter-war period.  
                                                 
17 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 24–5. 
18 Ernst Junger, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, 5th ed., 40th thousand (Berlin, 1933) quoted in 
Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 28. 
19 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 28. 
20 W. Hoeppener-Flatow, Stosstrupp Markmann greift an! Der Kampf eines Frontsoldaten (Berlin, 
1939), quoted in Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 27.  
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2. Treaty of Versailles 
On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed and would unknowingly 
lay the groundwork for the eventual rise of German paramilitary organizations, including 
the SA and SS that would exemplify evil in the Third Reich. This was not the intention of 
the allies, but more of an unforeseen side effect of limiting German military strength. The 
allies’ intentions were to punish the Germans for starting the war and to ensure that they 
would not be able to build up the forced necessary to go to war again.  
From Article 163 of the Treaty of Versailles: 
The reduction of the strength of the German military forces as provided 
for in Article 160 may be effected gradually in the following manner: 
Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
total number of effectives must be reduced to 200,000 and the number of 
units must not exceed twice the number of those laid down in Article 160. 
 At the expiration of this period, and at the end of each subsequent period 
of three months, a Conference of military experts of the Principal Allied 
and Associated Powers will fix the reductions to be made in the ensuing 
three months, so that by March 31, 1920, at the latest the total number of 
German effectives does not exceed the maximum number of 100,000 men 
laid down in Article 160. In these successive reductions the same ratio 
between the number of officers and of men, and between the various kinds 
of units, shall be maintained as is laid down in that Article.21 
Germany was forced to downsize from a strength of over a half-million men to 100,000 
in less than one year. Hundreds of thousands of young men returning from war were met 
with unemployment. These veterans found work doing what they knew best, fighting, in 
Freikorps units throughout Germany. The new German army, reduced to a shell of its 
previous self, was unable to ensure order, leaving the door open for other entities to 
capitalize on the weakness of the army. The paramilitary groups that developed did so in 
an effort to maintain order where the army could not. “Thus in a certain respect the 
requirement that Germany disarm fostered the rebirth of that militaristic spirit which the 
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conquerors had tried so hard to exorcize.”22 A government that was accustomed to a great 
military force at its disposal was now left with no real army and hundreds of thousands of 
returning veterans that just finished years of intense fighting. Diehl described the nature 
of paramilitary forces after the Paris treaty as the following: 
As a result there arose alongside the Reichswehr an unofficial military 
force, an extensive network of paramilitary organizations, whose rank 
were filled by the militarily disenfranchised, the ‘military desperados’ of 
the postwar years, who were either unable or unwilling to demobilize 
psychologically.23  
Expecting soldiers returning from over four years of never-ending warfare to 
immediately detach mentally from the military mindset is a sure fire way to create 
problems between the government and veterans.  
a. The Stab in the Back 
It was not only the reduction in force that contributed to the rise in paramilitary 
participation; the feeling by many veterans that they were stabbed in the back by their 
new democratic government played a very important role in the increasing number of 
volunteers. Regardless of how the surrender of the Germans actually happened, the 
majority of soldiers believed that the government turned on them. The German Reich did 
not make this rumor easy to dismiss, especially when their propaganda to the soldiers is 
examined. A pamphlet issued to returning soldiers explains: 
A new Germany greats you!...Perhaps you do not return as victors who 
have completely crushed the enemy to the ground…But neither do you 
return as vanquished, for the war was stopped at the wishes of the 
leadership of the Reich (Reichsleitung)…so you can hold your head 
high.24 
 
                                                 
22 Erich Eych, A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite, 
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The government appears to have given up without giving the front-line soldiers a chance 
for victory. The German soldiers were a very proud group and to be told that they were 
surrendering by civilians, not in the fight, was a powerful blow. As Robert Waite pointed 
out: 
Most volunteers wanted nothing more than to continue their military 
careers. The functional loyalty of the volunteers, especially the Free 
Corps, was in large part sustained by the expectation that they would find 
a place in the new Reichswehr. Had this been possible, their tenuous 
loyalty might have been maintained, but the harsh military provisions of 
the peace settlement made the fulfillment of such expectations 
impossible.25 
Although the government’s reason for surrendering was far from hurting the veterans, the 
returning soldiers only saw the failure of the government to look out for them. They were 
forced back into a defeated society without any work. These war veterans wanted to 
continue working in a profession that they had come to perfect over the past many years, 
and without the German Army as a choice, the paramilitary organizations filled the void.  
C. WHO JOINED THE FREIKORPS? 
While many older veterans, especially those of the Franco-Prussian War joined 
Kriegervereine (veteran’s organizations) or other nationalistic groups that more or less 
remained in familiar social and political boundaries, the younger population flocked to 
the more activist and modern Free Corps organizations, which burst these boundaries in 
the post war world.26 The anti-Republican sentiment was strong among the youth of 
Germany, and the Free Corps units provided the outlet to take action on those views. The 
youth, those not old enough for war during the Great War, missed out on the experience 
of great combat and found the Free Corps units to be the perfect outlet to live out their 
fantasies of violence.27 Instead of consorting with the pacifist government that had 
betrayed them, returning veterans also found comfort in Free Corps units. The returning 
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soldiers found “comradeship, understanding, economic security, and a continuation of the 
military life he had learned to love.”28 The Free Corps units were made up of likeminded 
soldiers who knew nothing but war. These units gave them all a sense of belonging that 
they did not have with the reduction of the military force.  
It was not only the enlisted soldiers that found comfort in the Free Corps units; 
officers were instrumental in Free Corps success. A major reason for the major influx of 
officers into volunteer units was rooted in the transformation the officer corps underwent 
during the war. At the start of the war, the German Army had just over 50,000 officers, 
when at the end, due to the rise in Storm Troop units and the overall expansion of the 
Army, reached over 270,000.29 An even larger change occurred that led to increased 
officer participation in paramilitary activities after the war. At the start of the war, the 
Officer Corps was comprised of older, veteran officers in turn drawn from the traditional 
social and even cultural sources of such men. Throughout the war, over half of those 
officers were killed, leading to a need for officers to be created quickly and to a kind of 
revolution in the officer corps that mirrored the radicalization of German society in total 
war. The Supreme Command used hastily created officers, usually young and 
inexperienced, who were commissioned after a few months of service at the front. These 
officers were not regarded highly by the enlisted men; however, they were continually 
pumped out and sent to lead soldiers. Also, the Supreme Command created some officers 
through promotion from the enlisted ranks. These “officers” came from the front-line 
troops and were seen as lesser officers than the regular Officer Corps, even as far as to 
have separate officer ranks for those men.30 Regardless of how an officer became an 
officer, they all felt they were real officers. They had enjoyed the privileges and increased 
social status as a result of their commissions, and when the war ended they were reluctant 
to give it up.  
                                                 
28 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 42. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
30 These officers were given the temporary ranks of either Feldwebel-Leutnant (Sergeant-Major-
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 15 
The problem these “lesser” officers faced stemmed from the Paris Peace Treaty’s 
restrictions on officer strength. The treaty stipulated that “the total effective strength of 
officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed 
four thousand.”31 With over 270,000 officers created during the war, and with the 
generals being from the old-school Officer Corps, these new officers were left out of the 
new army. It was primarily those new officers, the lieutenants and captains, which made 
the transition to the Free Corps movement after the war. The junior officers wanted to 
remain part of the military enterprise, but were relegated to the paramilitary world. This 
turned out to be a promotion for most of these officers. These were now commanding 
more troops and did not have to rely on the government to assign them men, allowing 
them to recruit and train their troops as they saw fit. As Waite explained, “the life of the 
freikorpsfürer was eminently satisfactory.”32 The young officers maintained their 
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III. PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN WEIMAR 
GERMANY 
A. FORMATION OF VOLUNTEER FORCES, 1918–1919 
After the November Revolution in 1918, Social Democrats were concerned with 
increased violence at home. To combat an uprising, they planned to use returning troops, 
but those troops were burnt out from fighting and were not useful in maintaining order. 
General Wilhelm Groener, the First Quartermaster General, advocated the creation of a 
volunteer force that could quell the revolutionary violence. The Supreme Command 
agreed and approved the creation of three types of volunteer forces at the end of 1918. 
The Free Corps (Freikorps), Auxiliary Volunteer Units (Zeitfreiwilligenverbände), and 
Civil Guards (Einwohnerwehren) groups successfully maintained order, but began to 
politicize and push beyond the regulation of the government. As James Diehl described,  
By creating or, better, by supporting the creation of a system of volunteer 
forces and then failing to control it, the new government lost—or failed to 
achieve—an effective monopoly of armed force and sowed the seeds for 
the later paramilitary activity that was to plague the Republic.33  
The government has lost the “monopoly of the legitimate use of force,”34 which the 
German sociologist Max Weber describes as the unique claim of the state.  
1. Rise of the Freikorps 
The Freikorps were the primary paramilitary groups in early Weimar Germany. 
Many young people joined Freikorps units because of rising unemployment and their 
ambition to remain in the military atmosphere. Many units existed prior to World War I, 
but most formed in late 1918 and early 1919. The primary unit was the Freiwilligen 
Landesjaegerkorps, formed by General Ludwig Maercker in December 1918. His 
formation of a Freikorps unit was the standard used by others in the coming years. Forces 
were raised quickly, and had the finances to support them with the backing of the 
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Supreme Command. Maercker’s unit was the ideal; most were less organized and 
professional, leading to less reliability for the Supreme Command. The slow progress of 
raising Freikorps units quickly reversed after an incident in January 1919.35  
2. Spartacist Week 
On January 6, 1919, 200,000 workers, backed by the Communists and 
Independents, took to the Berlin streets to protest the formation of the volunteer Freikorps 
units.36 At the time, the Freikorps units were not fully prepared for an uprising of this 
magnitude, forcing Gustav Noske, the minister in charge of military affairs, to leave the 
city. A few days later, the revolutionary mood waned giving the government the 
opportunity for reclaiming the city. After the rebellion was initially overwhelmed, 
Freikorps troops entered the city and proved their worth. The Reinhard Brigade attacked 
the Spartacus headquarters in Spandau on January 10, and Stephani’s Potsdam Free 
Corps attacked the Belle-Alliance-Platz and forced the surrender of revolutionaries from 
the Vorwärts newspaper building.37 The next morning, Noske entered the city leading 
3,000 members of Maercker’s unit and the Iron Division that Noske formed in Kiel. 
These units quickly occupied and restored order to Berlin, returning it to the hands of the 
government. They also captured and killed Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the 
leaders of the Spartacus League. After this victory, Freikorps units had little problem in 
recruiting more members, turning them into a force that would be able to quell and 
resistance throughout the Reich. The use of the Freikorps as a police force against 
workers and the left-wing parties set a precedent that would be repeated over the next 
months.38 
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3. Ludwig von Maercker’s Landesjaegerkorps 
Following the crushing of the Spartacus uprising in January 1919 and another 
conflict between government forces and Communists, Independents, and some Majority 
Socialists in March of that year, Maercker took his forces throughout central Germany to 
restore order in areas threatened by leftist revolts. His forces were organized in “small, 
self-sufficient units precisely as the Storm Troops of the war had done.”39 As he pushed 
through Germany, Maercker formed Auxiliary Volunteer and Civil Guard units to 
support his Freikorps units. The Auxiliary Volunteer units were not continuously 
activated, being called up when needed by the Freikorps units. They were a reserve force 
that could be used in emergencies, when the Freikorps units were insufficient. These 
Auxiliary Volunteer units were composed primarily of students due to the part-time 
nature of the units. This resulted in school closings when those units were activated. Until 
the Treaty of Versailles curtailed Germany’s plan to use the Freikorps as a reserves force, 
the Reichswehr Ministry fully supported the Auxiliary Volunteer units. As General 
Maercker described, the purpose of those units was “to close the gaps within the 
Reichswehr.”40 The Civil Guard units on the other hand were created to establish law and 
order in their local area. The greatest difference between the Freikorps units and the Civil 
Guard was the demographics of its members. While the Freikorps and Auxiliary 
Volunteer units consisted of ex-officers and students, the Civil Guard units had all areas 
of society in its membership, especially the middle class. The Civil Guards specific tasks 
were:  
to strengthen local police by taking over guard and patrol duties and 
providing auxiliary personnel; to cordon streets and public places; to 
protect train stations and other public buildings; to support troops in house 
searches; to strengthen regular troops by providing shock troops recruited 
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These organizations allowed Maercker to crush leftist revolts and restore order without 
having to leave his troops behind. He would create Civil Guard units, made up of mostly 
middle-class citizens, which would maintain order while Maercker’s troops would move 
on to the next city.  
4. Other Paramilitary Units 
Along with Maercker’s Volunteer Rifles, many other paramilitary groups formed 
in the immediate post-war epoch. The most powerful units were Reinhard’s Brigade, the 
Suppe Free Corps, the Third Naval Brigade, and Ehrhardt’s Brigade. Colonel Wilhelm 
Reinhard founded his Brigade on December 26, 1918. Although Reinhard claims 
responsibility for the innovations in the Free Corps movement, he pulled many ideas 
from Maercker’s success. For example, both Maercker’s Landesjaegerkorps and 
Reinhard’s Brigade used the Vertrauensleute, “‘Trusted Men’ to serve as intermediaries 
between officers and men,”42 as well as using very similar regulations. Another 
revolutionary Free Corps unit was the Suppe Free Corps, founded by Sergeant-Major 
Suppe. This unit was unique in that it was commanded by a non-commissioned officer. 
Even after Suppe’s Free Corps were integrated into the Reinhard Brigade, he maintained 
command of a battalion. The Third Naval Brigade, created by Admiral Wilfred von 
Loewenfeld, was composed of many highly decorated U-boat commanders along with 
other naval war veterans.  
In January 1919, Hermann Ehrhardt struck down a Sparticist uprising in the naval 
town of Wilhelmshaven with the help of fellow naval officers. After this great success, 
Noske authorized him to create his own volunteer organization. The turnout for his 
Brigade was overwhelming and Ehrhardt had the pick of the best men for his outfit. 
Ehrhardt had one of the best trained and elite Freikorps unit in 1919, which proved itself 
time and again in Upper Silesia fighting nationalistic Polish groups. Upper Silesia was a 
contentious area, which required the use of both military and paramilitary units to restore 
order. T. Hunt Tooley recognized the importance of the paramilitary groups when he 
stated that, “Only the rapid action of the German military and paramilitary auxiliaries had 
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saved the region.”43 After battling in Upper Silesia, Ehrhardt’s Brigade was then called to 
Berlin to suppress Communist uprisings, but were ordered to disband by Noske while 
outside of Berlin.44 This did not sit well with Ehrhardt and would contribute to his 
participation in the Kapp Putsch. 
B. THE KAPP PUTSCH 1920 
1. Four Days until Failure  
Although the initial coup succeeded, and Kapp was able to establish himself as 
chancellor, many reasons led to the eventual defeat of the putsch. First, the “lack of 
preparation and coordination of the Free Corps must be considered and essential cause of 
the failure of the coup.”45 From the volunteers being drunk throughout the putsch, to lack 
of communication about the putsch attempt, the Free Corps were not ready to effectively 
overtake and retain Berlin. The main reason that they were successful in occupying 
Berlin was that the troops in the city would not fight their German brothers. Along with 
the failures of the Free Corps, poor planning and ineptitude on the part of the new 
government played into the failure of the putsch. Kapp, Ludendorff, Pabst, Lüttwitz, and 
the other leaders did not plan the new government, but rather acted on a whim. In 
addition, the majority of the German people did not support the new government. The 
people had seen many changes in government over the recent years and were not willing 
to give up on the new Republic. Most importantly, however, was Noske and other Social 
Democrats calling upon the workers to stand up and strike. Everything in the city 
stopped; water, gas, trash, and transportation services ceased. Over the next few days, 
more and more supporters deserted the cause and by March 17, Kapp was forced to 
resign. The rest of his government followed shortly after and fled Berlin. The Ehrhardt 
Brigade left Berlin that afternoon, killing some civilian hecklers on their way out. Thus 
the Kapp Putsch came to an end a mere four days after it had begun.46 
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2. Buildup to the Putsch 
After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, many of the Freikorps units were 
forced to disband in order to comply with the size limitation placed on the German Army. 
The Freikorps units were becoming more revolutionary, as their initial reason for 
creation, crushing leftist uprisings, had become obsolete. The talks of a coup had been 
discussed in the senior Freikorps ranks since the signing of the treaty. This all came to 
fruition in the spring of 1920. When Noske ordered the disbandment of Ehrhardt’s 
Brigade and Lowenfeld’s Brigade on February 29, 1920, the stage was set for a putsch 
attempt. Ehrhardt refused to disband his unit and staged a parade the next day without 
inviting Noske, but instead had the support of General Walther von Lüttwitz, the 
commander of all regular troops in and around Berlin. In a meeting that occurred between 
Lüttwitz and Chancellor Ebert, Lüttwitz demanded that the order to disband the units be 
cancelled, as well as the National Assembly be dissolved and new elections take place. 
Ebert and Noske rejected these demands and subsequently demanded Lüttwitz’s 
resignation. Lüttwitz did not resign, but rather went to Ehrhardt to see when his troops 
could occupy Berlin. Ehrhardt planned to enter Berlin on March 13, 1920 to facilitate the 
establishment of a new government. At this point, Lüttwitz brought in the namesake of 
the putsch, Wolfgang Kapp, as well as Erich Ludendorff and Waldemar Pabst, members 
of the political club, the Nationale Vereinigung, to plan the new authoritarian 
government. Lüttwitz did not enjoy the full support of all Freikorps leaders; Maercker 
and von Seeckt were against the putsch idea.47 Regardless, the units that he did have 
support from, namely Ehrhardt’s Brigade, prepared for the march on Berlin. 
3. Taking Berlin 
Late on March 12, 1920, Ehrhardt marched his troops toward Berlin, planning to 
take the city and overthrow the sitting government. After talks with two Reichswehr 
generals, Ehrhardt agreed to not enter Berlin until 7:00 A.M. to give the government time 
to accept the demands of Lüttwitz. At 1:00 A.M. on March 13, 1920, Noske met with the 
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military leaders in Berlin in what would be “one of the most decisive conferences in the 
history of the Weimar Republic,”48 and concluded that the army in Berlin was not 
prepared to fire on other Germans, even if they were trying to overthrow the government. 
Only General Reinhardt and Noske’s chief of staff agreed that a fight was necessary. The 
rest turned to General Seeckt, who would make a statement that would lead to the 
government’s evacuation of the city: 
Troops do not fire on troops. Do you perhaps intend, Herr Minister, that a 
battle be fought before the Brandenburger Tor between troops who have 
fought side by side against the common enemy? … When Reichswehr 
fires of Reichswehr, then all comradeship within the officer Corps has 
vanished.49 
After this meeting with the military commanders, Noske met with the cabinet at 
4:00 A.M. to discuss their options. They decided on two courses of action. First they 
were going to flee the city, with the exception of a few members that wished to stay 
behind to negotiate with the putschists. The fleeing of the city occurred rather quickly, 
having to interrupt their meeting at 6:15 A.M. do to the impending Free Corps units. 
Second, the cabinet called for a general strike from all workers in the city. Minutes after 
Noske and the cabinet left, Ehrhardt’s Brigade made its way through the Brandenburg 
Gate and took control of the Reich Chancellery. Kapp then declared himself Chancellor 
and set up his new government. Noske and his officials fled to Dresden and were met by 
General Maercker, who informed them that he was ordered to arrest them all. Maercker 
was loyal to the Ebert government and vowed to support them in any way. The same was 
proclaimed by General von Bergmann, the Reichswehr commander. There was now a 
divide between the Volunteer units, with some supporting Kapp’s regime and others 
supporting the legal Ebert government.50 
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4. Fallout from the Failed Putsch 
The primary outcome of the failed Kapp Putsch would show itself in the coming 
decade, namely with the increasing distrust of the civilian government by Freikorps 
members. Many Volunteers believed that, “Politicians of the traditional type had forfeited 
forever their chance to govern Germany because they had shown that they lacked what… 
[they] considered the one primary essential of the new government: ruthless action.”51 
The Free Corps soldiers were moving from being simple soldiers doing their job to a 
politicized force that had the power to enact change.  
Immediately following the putsch, Communists across the country took advantage 
of the strike initiated by the Republic and stirred up unrest and disorder. The Republic 
was forced to call in the same Free Corps units that had just overthrown the government. 
They performed admirably, crushing revolts from Berlin across the Reich. In the Ruhr, 
Communists controlled the majority of the region, battling Free Corps units that were not 
prepared. By April 1920, the Free Corps units were ready to launch an attack on the 
Communists, and on April 3 under General Freiherr von Watter, they did just that. Within 
five days, the Free Corps units controlled the Ruhr. After the battle in the Ruhr and defeat 
of the Communists uprisings, the Free Corps units across Germany were dissolved by 
Ebert’s government.52 The Free Corps units had gone from being supported by the 
government, to overthrowing it, reintegrating into the Republic, defeating the 
Communists, to being tossed aside. They had been through a roller coaster ride of change 
in 1920, and this would lead to politicization and radicalism in the coming years. German 
officer and journalist Frederick Wilhelm von Oertzen recognized the impact of the Kapp 
Putsch on the future rise of National Socialism and subsequent SA and SS rise to power. 
He stated, “Everything that the Free Corps experienced in the bloody spring of 1920 may 
be considered the preparation of the soil for the seed which was planted by National  
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Socialism and harvested under Adolf Hitler.”53 Over the coming years, paramilitary 
activity would disappear from the public realm, where the government could exercise 
some control, and into the underground. 
C. “THE WAR IN THE DARKNESS” 
After the failed Kapp Putsch, General Hans von Seeckt took command of the 
Republic’s Army and began forming it to comply with the Treaty of Versailles while still 
being a capable force despite its small size. He sought to build an army of highly trained, 
specifically selected soldiers. A man of the guard and the general staff, the revolutionary 
soldiers of the Free Corps units did not fit into Seeckt’s mold of the perfect soldier, and 
were thus left out of the Reichswehr. Seeckt did not trust the Free Corps soldiers, 
especially after their participation in the Kapp Putsch and their overall revolutionary 
mindset. He stated in an order he sent to the army on April 18, 1920: 
Those that do not condemn the unfortunate attempt made during the 
month of March at overthrowing the government, and those who believe 
that a repetition would end in anything but new misfortune for our people 
and for the Reichswehr, should decide on their own that the Reichswehr is 
not for them.54  
This is not to say that Seeckt was a staunch supporter of the Republic, but rather he 
wanted to use the existing structure to elevate his army to a position of control to a level 
above the government in the hope that the republic would eventually vanish and the old 
army would reassert its primary role in the state. His loyalty was to Germany, not 
necessarily the Weimar Republic, which he saw as potential transitory regime. Many of 
the Free Corps members distrusted Seeckt as well; they felt betrayed and did not 
understand his plan for the army. Some of the more organized Free Corps units did enjoy 
a spot in Seeckt’s new army. This included Maercker’s Volunteer Rifles, the Reinhard 
Free Corps, and the Von Epp Brigade. These units remained virtually unchanged when 
they became units of the Reichswehr. Even as these units became part of the German 
Army, their founders still maintained some of the Free Corps spirit that led to their 
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success. Maercker founded another unit later in his life that was an affiliate of the 
Stahlhelm, one of the large underground paramilitary groups. Reinhard created another 
Reinhard Free Corps in retirement, and used his new unit to fight in Upper Silesia in 
1921. Finally, von Epp used his place in the Reichswehr to recruit for and fund other 
paramilitary organizations that were anti-Republic.55  
1. The Rise of the Black Reichswehr: Labor Associations 
Once Free Corps units were forced by Seeckt to dissolve in order to comply with 
the Treaty of Versailles, the leaders had to find new ways to organize their men. Instead 
of simply dissolving their units, many commanders covered up the true nature of their 
Free Corps units by organizing labor associations. Throughout Germany, labor 
associations popped up, giving the Free Corps units a place to continue their 
revolutionary talks while staying under the government’s radar. One of the most obvious 
examples of the lengths that a Free Corps unit would undergo to remain together is the 
case of the Rossbach Sturmabteilung. After being incorporated into the Reichswehr and 
helping quell the Kapp Putsch and strike that followed, von Seeckt ordered Rossbach to 
disband his unit. He refused and instead organized an agricultural organization that saw 
his men placed on estates in Pomerania and West Prussia. Weapons were shipped under 
the guise of “machine tools” after his men were settled. Rossbach then opened a 
nightclub in Berlin that would serve as his headquarters. This allowed him to receive than 
distribute weapons to the estates where his men were. His organization built up their 
stockpile as well as suppressing the other labor unions in the region, using stormtroopers 
to arrest vocal workers and trying them in an internal court, which usually resulted in a 
death sentence. After participating in fighting in Upper Silesia with other non-existent 
Free Corp units, they resumed their work on the farms, while still stockpiling their 
weapons. In November 1921, the Arbeitgemeinschaften (labor associations) were 
declared illegal, but that did not deter Rossbach. He created “Detective Bureaus” as well  
 
 
                                                 
55 Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, 183–7; Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 382–9. 
 27 
as a “Savings Society” as fronts to his Free Corps unit. Those were outlawed as well, so 
Rossbach changed the name of the “Savings Society” to the “Union for Agricultural 
Instruction.”  
No matter what organizations the government banned, the name could be changed 
without changing the internal workings of the group. The government was not too 
concerned with these groups, as long as they were not attempting to overthrow the 
government. It knew the German Army was incapable of defeating a large Bolshevik 
uprising from Poland, so “Government officials therefore closed at least one eye to illegal 
Free Corps activity.”56 Free Corps units remained underground, but not so far where they 
could not be easily mobilized if the opportunity presented itself. The Free Corps units 
were also resourceful in acquiring financing. The Republic would compensate anyone for 
surrendering weapons. The Free Corps would then steal weapons, some from the 
government, then turn them in for profit. Rossbach took a different approach. He would 
sell arms to the Poles, then send his troops in to reacquire them. He would then resell 
them to another Polish group. It created a never-ending stream of revenue for his 
organization.57  
2. The Civil Guards  
In addition to the labor associations, other veterans of the Army and Free Corps 
units joined organizations that allowed them to stay in contact with their brothers-in-arms 
and keep their connection to the military profession. One such type of these organizations 
was the Civil Guards (Einowohnerwehr). Civil Guards were not a new creation, they had 
been used since the November Revolution in 1918–1919 with the support of the 
government. They also recalled entities created by citizens in the 1848 revolution. This 
did not change as the effects of the Treaty of Versailles were seen. To appease the Allies, 
the German government told them that these Einowohnerwehr were not militaristic but 
rather were just like a private club. In reality, they were very military oriented with 
regular drilling by Reichswehr officers. A circular letter, sent to Einowohnerwehr leaders 
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by the Minister of Defense, illustrated that those units were militaristic and would even 
by incorporated into the Reichswehr if an emergency arose. A separate circular, issued 
after the Allies became wary of the true nature of the Civil Guards, however, talked of 
civil authorities taking over the organizations, but still retaining military officers to act as 
advisors. Also, oral orders, as opposed to written orders, were to be used, presumably to 
avoid showing the true nature of the Civil Guard units. Even though technically illegal 
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the government continued to support the 
Einowohnerwehr organizations by providing arms and training.58 
3. Youth Movement  
In order to further the revolutionary ideals of the Free Corps, numerous youth 
organizations were created. First, the Schilljungend was founded by Rossbach, “in order 
to carry on the tradition of the Free Corps directly,” and to “purge from the old 
established youth movement all purely intellectual elements and attract all the most 
activist element.”59 Second the Hitler Youth (HJ) would grow to become a feeder for the 
SA and SS. Along with these two youth organizations ran by paramilitary groups, the 
Kyffhäuserbund, the collection of veterans organizations originally created in the late 
19th century, created their own youth organization. The Kyffäuserjugend, founded in 
1922 did not enjoy the spotlight like the HJ or Jungstahlhelm did later in the decade. 
Nonetheless, it had 150,000 members and “was to play a not insignificant part in the 
courses run by the later Reichskuratorium für Jugendertüchtigung.”60 The 
Reichskuratorium für Jugendertüchtigung, created in 1932, was an organization aimed at 
providing military education for the youth of Germany. The Jungstahlhelm, created in 
late 1923, trained young men aged 17 to 23. It prepared them for service in the 
Stahlhelm, which was losing its veteran base. The Jungdeutscher Orden’s youth 
organization, the Knappenschaften began in the early 1920s, but split into rival groups 
and ultimately forgotten until 1925. In 1925, the Jundgo restarted their youth 
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organizations, setting up two different groups, one for 12 to 15 year olds and the other 
for16 to 21 year olds. Many other political combat leagues created their own youth 
organizations, which would feed into the parent organizations, providing a constant 
source of anti-Republic influence.61 As Diehl explained:  
In terms of the crucial problem of winning youth over to the ideals of the 
Republic, the youth organizations of the Political Combat Leagues, like 
their parent organizations, provided an organizational heaven for those 
who could not or would not come to terms with the realities of the Weimar 
Republic. The functioned, in a very real sense, as negative schools of 
politics.62 
The existence of these youth organizations ensured the continued growth and success of 
the parent paramilitary groups. Although most of these youth organizations existed 
immediately following World War I, they took off after 1923 with the reorganization of 
the paramilitary enterprise. 
4. Jungdeutscher Orden, Stahlhelm, and the Beginning of the SA 
The Jungdeutscher Orden (Jundgo), or Young German League, was one of the 
largest military associations in Germany. It existed before the war, but grew substantially 
from about 100 men in 1919, to 70,000 when it was temporarily disbanded in 1921, to 
400,000 in 1922.63 The Stahlhelm, like the Jundgo, started earlier but grew after the war 
during the reduction in force to comply with the Treaty of Versailles. It was founded on 
the basis of organizing front-line veterans. This morphed from supporting returning 
soldiers financially and promoting law and order, to radicalizing and politicalizing.  
In Bavaria, the paramilitary groups had much more influence on politics than 
those in the north. The Bavarian Civil Guards and other paramilitary groups were relied 
upon by the Minister President, leading to the inability to dissolve those units without 
problems. In addition, Bavaria believed it was above the Republic and refused to dissolve 
the Civil Guards and the Orgesch, a conglomerate of many paramilitary groups aimed at 
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rebuilding the Empire. Unfortunately, those organizations were ordered to dissolve in 
May 1921. Like the paramilitary groups in the north, the Civil Guards and the Orgesch 
attempted to find ways around the order.  
Initially, two plans to counter the requirement to dissolve these groups were laid 
out by Hans Freiherr Riedel, the secretary of Escherich, and Otto Pittinger, a high official 
in Civil Guard in Oberpfalz and the Orgesch. Riedel suggested that compromise with the 
Allies should be the initial goal, but if that failed, then the groups should go underground 
and form secret organizations. On the other hand, Pittinger advocated flat out refusal of 
dissolution and suggested a war with Poland or Czechoslovakia to unite Germany under a 
new government and force France to either mobilize, which he felt was unlikely, or back 
down. If this action was not taken, he thought that the Civil Guards should disband 
themselves in order to form a secret organization, but this should only be done as a last 
resort. The actual course of action taken was just that; the Civil Guard dissolved itself in 
June 1921 and went underground, eventually being run by Pittinger under the name 
Organization Pittinger (Org. Pi). By the next year, Pittinger realized that an underground 
organization would not work for the political ambitions he had for the group. In order to 
further his political ambitions, he founded the Bund Bayern und Reich, a paramilitary 
organization similar to the Stahlhelm or Jungdeutscher Orden. Just like in the north, the 
group operated in politics as well as conducted military training. The Bund Bayern und 
Reich would remain the largest paramilitary organization in Bavaria until it merged with 
the Stahlhelm in 1929.64  
Along with the Bund Bayern und Reich, other organizations were growing, with 
the divide between them being the social and political status of its members. According 
to Diehl, “While the bourgeois-conservative forces tended to join Bayern und Reich, the 
völkisch, proto-fascist elements joined the Bund Oberland or the paramilitary units 
associated with the fledgling German National Socialist Workers’ Party (NSDAP).”65 
The NSDAP was on the rise under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, and in 1920 the 
precursor to the SA, the Turn-und Sportabteilung (Gymnastic and Sport Detachment) was 
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founded with Emil Maurice as its leader. As Hitler gained more control of the party in 
1921, he transformed the now know SA into a robust organization. By receiving 
financing and officers from Captain Hermann Ehrhardt as well as recruits from the 
recently disbanded volunteer organizations, the SA was rapidly growing and gaining 
power. There was a major difference, however, between the veterans’ organizations and 
the SA. The SA was not a military association, but rather an arm of a political party, an 
organization created purely for political means instead of a collection point for war 
veterans. As Diehl described the SA, “Initially, its purpose was not to maintain order, or 
to defend Germany against external attack, but to combat specific political opponents 
within the context of day-to-day political activity.”66 The SA would continue to grow as 
Hitler’s power grew and he used them as his strong arm.  
D. THE CRISIS OF 1923 
In January 1923, after Germany failed to provide reparation payments on time, 
France took this opportunity to move into the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial hub. France 
was going to get their payments by force if needed. This marked a turning point for 
German paramilitary participation and for the Nazi SA organization. Once again, the 
Republic realized that it could not protect Germany with the 100,000 man army and 
called on the Free Corps to help. In an agreement between Ebert (President of Germany), 
Seeckt (Commander in Chief of the German Army), Carl Severing (Minister of the 
Interior), Braun (Prime Minister of Prussia), and Wilhelm Cuno (Chancellor), the labor 
associations and sports societies that formed after the dissolution of the Free Corps units 
would form a reserve force of labor troops to assist the Reichswehr.67 This would become 
to be known as the black Reichswehr. By the summer, former Free Corps soldiers, as 
well as students swelled the number in the Black Reichswehr to between 50,000 and 
80,000 men. No one within the government would publicly admit that this group was 
anything more than a labor force used to destroy German arms. In reality, most knew that 
this was the making of a reserve army and they were stockpiling weapons, not destroying 
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them. The Black Reichswehr would not last long however, as it was dissolved in 
September 1923 after a failed putsch attempt by the group. Afterwards, most of the 
leaders found a home with the NDSP and the SA.68  
Although the occupation of the Ruhr by French forces was not met with active 
fighting, mass recruitment into paramilitary groups continued. This resulted in both 
extremes, the far right (NSDAP) and the far left (SPD and KPD), expanding their 
paramilitary organizations. Both sides were becoming more active in their use of their 
respective paramilitary organizations, with clashes between the groups happening more 
frequently. The right wished for increased clashes between the left and right, in hopes 
that the government would call on them to restore order as had happened in the past. Both 
sides wanted to push their political agenda; “While the right demanded a war of liberation 
and the establishment of a national dictatorship, the Communists declared that the time 
for the ‘German October’ had come.”69 When the government put an end to the passive 
resistance in the Ruhr, both sides planned to execute their political plans. The Communist 
paramilitary groups prepared for their uprising planned for October, while the right held 
demonstrations and demanded a dictatorship. The SA’s political strength was growing 
with the help of the Ruhr occupation. “The occupation of the Ruhr district ultimately had 
great significance for the development of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (storm troops). In the 
spring and summer of 1923 the reorientation of the S.A. toward a military fighting 
organization made great strides.”70 Hitler’s NSDAP paramilitary wing, the SA, had 
become more militaristic during the occupation, starting down a path that would lead to a 
putsch attempt in November 1923. 
On November 8, 1923, in a beer hall in Munich, Adolf Hitler and his colleagues 
interrupted Gustav Ritter von Kahr, a right-wing politician who was Hitler’s rival, and 
announced the start of the revolution to replace the Bavarian government. Hitler had his 
SA men surround the hall to prevent any escape by Kahr and his men. The next day, 
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Hitler marched with his men, even though he knew the putsch attempt would not succeed. 
When his Nazi soldiers were met by the Bavarian police, shots were fired, Nazis died, 
and Hitler fled quickly. Two days later, he was arrested, thus ending the short-lived Beer 
Hall Putsch.71 The tumultuous 1923 year showed the inability of paramilitary 
organizations to stage a revolution and it appeared that paramilitary groups were heading 
to failure.  
E. POLITICAL COMBAT LEAGUES AND PARAMILITARY ACTION 
AFTER 1923 
After 1923, paramilitary organizations could no longer focus primarily on military 
activity, but rather focus on politics. The groups transformed into political combat 
leagues to better align their new priority of political positioning. As Diehl explained it, 
the military associations “sought to transform…from a military organization with a 
political character…into a political organization with a military character.”72 The SDP 
and KPD created their own combat leagues to counter the combat leagues of the right. 
This created political violence that would increase over the rest of the decade. Many 
paramilitary organizations were dissolved or transformed into the new political combat 
leagues, most notably the SA and the Bund Bayern und Reich.73 
The SA, severely impacted by the failed Beer Hall Putsch, banned, and with 
Hitler and Ernst Röhm in prison, looked destined for oblivion. After Röhm’s release from 
prison in April 1924, he traveled through the country to resurrect SA units. Röhm 
structured his revived paramilitary group as the Frontbann, as a counter to the 
Reichswehr’s own organization, the Notbann. The Frontbann “was to serve as the 
backbone and support for the National Socialist political movement.”74 When Hitler was 
released from prison in 1925, the end of the Frontbann was near. Röhm wanted to absorb 
the SA into the Frontbann under the National Socialist movement and have himself 
remain the leader of the group at the disposal of Hitler. However, Hitler planned to have 
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the Frontbann and SA integrated into the NSDAP directly under the control of Hitler. 
Röhm was offered the leadership of the SA, but declined and resigned as head of the 
Frontbann, and thus the Frontbann soon ceased to exist. He left Germany to become a 
military advisor to the Bolivian government75  
While the SA and the Frontbann stood opposed to the government, the Bund 
Bayern und Reich aligned itself with Kahr and the Bavarian government. While some 
members of the organization did not agree with this, and subsequently left for more 
radical groups, the majority remained. In addition, members of the Bund were 
encouraged to join the Notbann to receive military training. The main reason for pushing 
of Bund members to join the Notbann had less to do with military training and more to do 
with weapons acquisition. As weapons disarmament took place, the Notbann retained 
their weapons, thus the Bund members who were also part of the Notbann would retain 
their weapons, which could be used in the Bund’s military endeavors. Through the end of 
1923 and early 1924, the relationship between the Bund and the Notbann grew 
increasingly stale. The Bund realized that they would not be able to control the Notbann, 
and the Notbann became increasingly skeptical of the Bund’s motives. Like the far right, 
the Bund wanted to see the end of the Republic, but unlike Hitler and other rightist 
groups, wanted to avoid forced takeover. The Bund realized the way to restore the 
German Fatherland was to become a patriotic organization and become involved in state 
politics instead of party politics. They would build the patriotic spirit so when the time 
came to liberate Germany only the military aspect would need to be mobilize.76  
As the 1920s continued, the political combat leagues became more involved in the 
politics of the Republic. From demonstrations, security at meetings, and distribution of 
leaflets, it was only a matter of time before clashes between leftist and rightist political 
combat leagues would occur. Meeting and conventions were constant sources of violence 
between groups, with each trying to counter the other. The combat leagues were not 
interested in overthrowing the government, but violence still occurred. Diehl explained, 
“Putschism may have been replaced by politics, but the violent and aggressive hostility of 
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the members of the Combat Leagues remained; instead of being focused directly against 
the state, however, it was directed against rival Combat Leagues.”77 Although the 
political combat leagues had abandoned their radical putschist ideals, at their heart, they 
were still made up of militaristic men who were vying for power in a weak nation. This 
became the standard; clashes between different groups happened regularly. These clashes 
would paved the way for greater violence that the NSDAP and SA would use in the 
coming years. Diehl recognized this and stated, “The ‘normalization’ of political violence 
during the Republics’ middle years did much to prepare the way for the massive 
onslaught of the NSDAP/SA after 1930.”78 The Reichstag was not able to control the 
political arena with all of these organizations, which had their own political mindset. The 
political combat leagues could not leverage their power into any discernable political 
power during the second half of the 1920s. 
One of the key reasons the political combat leagues lost some of their power had 
to do with Germany’s attempt to join the League of Nations in the second half of the 
1920s and the normalization of politics in the years of stability more or less in a period 
from 1924 until 1929. When Paul von Hindenburg became President of Germany in 
1925, he actively sought to get Germany included in the League of Nations. If this 
became a reality, war with France was off the table, ruining the paramilitary 
organizations’ wishes for liberation. By allying with the “enemy,” secret paramilitary 
organizations would not occupy the same level of acceptance in the government as they 
did previously. All of the combat leagues’ attempts to persuade the government to reject 
the Locarno Treaties failed, and at the end of 1925, Germany signed the treaties, setting 
up admittance into the League of Nations. Over the next year, paramilitary violence 
reduced as the combat leagues focused more on politics and less on violence. They 
realized that the way to make change was to infiltrate the politics of the state and not to 
use force. Some combat leagues made the transition easier than others; the Stahlhelm 
transformed into a political organization relatively easy, although they did not have a 
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clear method to acquire the power they wanted.79 On the other hand, “the Jungdo’s 
refusal to participate in the existing political system reinforced its members’ alienation 
from the Republic and kept them from coming to terms with it,” and later the “young, 
radicalized youth either left or bypassed completely such organizations as the Jungdo in 
favor of the NSDAP/SA, which seemed the promise many of the advantages of the 
former while at the same time offering to prospect of tangible political power.”80 The 
inability of some groups to adapt to the changing political landscape led to many ditching 
their former organizations in favor of the more radical Nazi movement. Over the next 
year or so before the Reichstag elections of 1928, combat leagues, particularly the 
Stahlhelm, attempted to pressure to political parties to adopt their wishes. This was met 
with little success, as all the rightists groups were forced to vote the way the parties 
wanted to avoid a leftist victory. Even with 500,000 members, the Stahlhelm was unable 
to influence the election in any meaningful way.81  
The elections of 1928 proved to be a failure on the part of the rightist combat 
leagues; the republic had gained ground and further alienated the right’s goal of a 
dictatorship. This played into the hands of the NSDAP and SA. As Diehl pointed out:  
The Republic’s triumph, more apparent than real, proved to be short lived; 
yet it produced a crisis on the right which was to prepare the way for the 
phenomenal rise of the NSDAP/SA and its emergence as the dominant 
political force on the right by 1930.82  
Again, the failures of the combat leagues drove people into the waiting arms of 
the NSDAP and SA. The constant competition with the political parties of the right 
caused division on the right, opening the door for the Nazi Party to seize power. Over the 
year or two after the Reichstag elections, the Stahlhelm attempted to get a foothold in the 
political parties, but was unsuccessful. Furthermore, their constant conflict with the 
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Jungdo caused a split on the right that left both the combat leagues and political parties at 
a standstill, leaving room for the NSDAP to step up.83  
The success of the NSDAP and SA after 1925 hinged on the ability of Hitler to 
reform the organization into a perfect mix of both a political party and a Combat League 
with a remarkable energy as well as delegation of authority within the Fuehrer Principle 
to lower echelons—a combination that always bulked crisis in it, however. “The 
NSDAP/SA combined the militaristic activism of the Combat Leagues with the electoral 
possibilities of a political party.”84 Hitler’s time in prison, in which he wrote Mein 
Kampf, was valuable in developing the role the SA would play in the reorganized Nazi 
Party. Instead of succumbing to the failures of 1923, where the SA dictated what the 
party would do, the Nazi Party would control the SA. This was cemented in 1926, when 
Hitler named Captain Franz Pfeffer von Salomon as Supreme SA Leader, and Salomon 
subsequently issued a series of orders that laid out the subordinate nature of the 
organization to the Nazi Party. Instead of conducting military training like other 
paramilitary groups, the SA emphasized sports and focused on propaganda for the Party. 
The Party also put specific requirements on the political affiliation of the SA members. 
All SA members were members of the Nazi Party and members of the party could only 
join the SA, not any other organization. Over the next few years, the SA had grown from 
“a small, variegated troop of approximately 6,000 at the end of 1925,” to a “well-
disciplined and centralized force of over 60,000”85 at the end of 1930. Once Hitler took 
an electoral process to power in 1927–28, the Nazi Party rapidly gained support from 
across Germany. Within this epoch, the SS became organized within the SA, and in 1929, 
Heinrich Himmler became Reichsfuehrer SS of a small organization within the SA 
Although many in the Party did not agree with this decision, it would pay off over the 
next five years as the NSDAP gained more and more power through elections. Finally, in 
1933, the NSDAP gained full control of Germany and the SA then became the militant 
arm of the most powerful political party in the nation.  
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IV. NAZIS AND PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
THIRD REICH  
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was named chancellor of Germany, which 
resulted in the SA and SS being elevated into a prominent position in the new Nazi state 
with its dual institutions. At the time, the SA was the main paramilitary arm of the Nazi 
Party, with the small SS designated as the party’s security force. The evening of January 
30, a parade was held through the center of Berlin comprising of SA, SS, and Stahlhelm 
members.86 This showed that the paramilitary organizations were going strong, even 
though they had been dissolved or morphed into other organizations during the previous 
decade. The Nazi Party brought extreme nationalism to the forefront of the German stage. 
As Peter Fritzsche described it:  
On the evening of 30 January German nationalism may have triumphed, a 
sweet vindication against Versailles, but it was a very different, much 
more revolutionary kind of nationalism than the sumptuous pageantry of 
Imperial Germany. Nearly one million Berliners took part in this 
extraordinary demonstration of allegiance to a party that promised to do 
away with both the sentimental bric-a-brac of the prewar past and the 
clutter of Weimar democracy and to establish strong-willed and strong-
armed racial state, a very new twentieth-century Germany.87 
The paramilitary arm of the Nazi party would come to have a major impact on the 
transformation of Germany into Nazi Germany. In the short amount of space allocated for 
this great expanse of events and knowledge, focus will be on three main areas: the Hitler 
Youth and its role in the Nazi Party, the SA and its rise and fall, and finally the SS and its 
role in the German state. Within these three areas of focus, some of the key players will 
be detailed as well as the role they played in the overall paramilitary movement in Nazi 
Germany.  
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A. HITLER YOUTH 
The Hitler Youth (HJ), was officially established in May 1922, but rose to 
dominance in the early 1930s. A major change to the organization of the Hitler Youth 
took place in October 1931. Hitler released a directive effectively placing the HJ under 
the direct control of the SA, whereas before the HJ were an independent group that 
worked closely with the SA.88  
1. Organization and Education 
The overarching Hitler Youth was organized into different sub-organizations 
based on age and sex. Initially, young boys and girls would enter school at the age of six 
and finish at age 15. The Nazi Party revamped the educational system to focus more time 
on physical training, as Hitler believed that “In general a healthy and strong intellect will 
normally be found only in a healthy body,”89 and that “the Völkisch state has to adjust its 
educational work not merely to the indoctrination of knowledge but in the first place to 
the production of bodies physically sound to the very core.”90 Sports were emphasized, 
especially boxing, which promoted quick thinking and courage. The material studied in 
school was taught with a National Socialist twist, pushing the idea of the master race 
concept.  
When the children reached age ten, they entered either Deutsches Jungvolk (DJV) 
for the boys or Deutsche Jungmädel (DJM) for the girls. They would be part of these 
organizations until they were 14. At age ten, the children were also tested for entrance 
into grammar school and the Nationalpolitsche Erziehungsanstalt (NPEA or Napola). 
The NPEA were schools “designed…to produce an elite which could fill posts in all 
spheres of German life, including the academic sphere.”91 The NPEA would become a 
recruitment base for future Waffen-SS officers under Heinrich Himmler in the late 1930s 
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and early 1940s. At age 12, those students not selected for grammar school had another 
chance as well as the possible acceptance to Adolf Hitler Schools (AHS), an institution 
similar to the NPEA but completely under the control of the NSDAP instead of the 
Ministry of Science and Education. At age 14, the DJV and DJM members would 
transition to the HJ for the boys and the Bund Deutscher Mädchen (BDM) for the girls.  
Those not selected for Grammar school, NPEAs, or AHSs would then enter a 
trade school. At 18, all members of the HJ and BDM would become part of the NSDAP. 
Students in the NPEAs and AHSs would begin university, which would be followed by a 
period of labor service for the party and then more professional training. NPEA and AHS 
graduates, as well as other suitable students, had the opportunity to enter the Ordensburg, 
a course of study at training castles that prepared students for service in the Nazi Party 
administration. After this school, the most highly qualified could attend the Hohe Schule, 
the party’s highest educational institution, which prepared students for the highest 
positions within the party.92 As H. W. Koch explained, “In practice this model was never 
fully implemented except at NPEA and AHS level. Moreover there were numerous ad 
hoc ‘training courses’ which allowed such stages as the AHS and Ordensburg…to be 
bypassed.”93 A diagram of the ideal path from age six through the educational milestones 
and Hitler Youth memberships can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Model of the Educational Pattern of the NS-State.94 
Paramilitary training became more prominent in the NPEAs as Himmler exercised 
more influence in the late 1930s and early 1940s. As World War II began, SS officers 
started to oversee paramilitary training at the NPEAs. As war waged on, a more military 
approach to training occurred at the NPPEAs, with the children being taught how to use 
whatever weapons they could physically handle. Along with propaganda indoctrination, 
paramilitary training set up many of the students for service in the SS under Himmler.95 
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2. Growth and Monopoly 
In 1932, the Hitler Youth grew substantially, growing from only 28,000 members 
in 1931 to over 100,000 by the end of 1932. The increasing power of the Nazi Party 
contributed to the success of the Hitler Youth, as well as the attraction to an illegal 
organization. Early in 1932, the Brüning government prohibited uniformed branches of 
the NSDAP, after Hitler refused to merge his paramilitary units into a singular 
paramilitary arm under the Reichswehr. As with most kids, if something is not allowed, 
they will want to do it, and the Hitler Youth was no exception. Although the Hitler Youth 
changed its name and cut ties with the SA to stay legal, the youth was drawn to the 
perceived illegal group, boosting its membership numbers. In June 1932, Brüning was 
replaced by Franz von Papen as Chancellor, and the Hitler Youth was allowed once 
again.96 After Hitler came to power in 1933, the Hitler Youth began absorbing other 
youth organizations and establishing itself as the only youth organization in Germany. 
Over the first half of 1933, the Hitler Youth intimidated its way into acquiring control of 
many of the youth organizations throughout the nation, and in June 1933, Baldur von 
Schirach, then the Reichsjugendführer of the NSDAP, was given the title of Jugendführer 
des Deutschen Reiches (Youth Leader of Germany). He was not only in charge of the 
Hitler Youth, he was now in charge of all youth organizations throughout the country. 
Any potential new organizations needed his blessing, which he would not give, forcing 
those youths to join the HJ.97 
Over the course of the 1930s, the Hitler Youth made great strides in taking over 
the education system in Germany, as well as many other youth organizations. Hitler 
Youth radio speakers, specially trained in a Hitler Youth Institute, forced change in a 
class-based education system. Special school caps were worn by those in grammar school 
to set them apart from other students; after the radio speakers confronted this practice, the 
caps were banned from the schools. In addition, schools which had a significant 
population of Hitler Youth members were awarded a special Hitler Youth banner.98  
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Both the Protestant and Catholic churches had their own youth groups, which 
posed a threat to the Hitler Youth. With the Protestant groups, the Hitler Youth made 
deals with them that opened the door for the eventual full control of these groups by the 
Hitler Youth. Initially, the Protestant groups worked with the Hitler Youth at the regional 
level, but this just made it easier for the Hitler Youth to recruit new members. Eventually, 
by December 1933, the Protestant youth groups were under full control of the NSDAP 
and Hitler Youth. The Catholic youth groups proved to be more difficult. Even as a 
concordat was in the works between the Holy See and Nazi Germany in July 1933, the 
NSDAP was set on controlling the Catholic youth groups. Over the next few years, 
constant debate over what the Catholic youth groups could teach occurred between the 
Catholic Church and the Hitler Youth leadership. Over time, the Catholic youth groups 
became less influential as the NSDAP outlawed more and more of their actions. Finally, 
in 1936, a law requiring all youths to join the Hitler Youth removed any chance for the 
Catholic youth groups to survive.99 
In 1934, a new unit within the Hitler Youth was established. The HJ-
Streifendienst, a police-type group that, according to Koch, was “to see that law and order 
were upheld within the ranks and to combat any illegal opposition.”100 The Streifendienst 
worked closely with the SS and would become the breeding ground for SS recruits, 
including the units used for guarding concentration camps.101 The Hitler Youth was 
extremely successful in raising future SA and SS members, leading to the fast rise in the 
numbers of the organizations in the 1930s.  
In the lead up to World War II, the Hitler Youth became more paramilitary 
oriented, opening HK rifle schools in 1937 and taking the view that that marksmanship is 
as important as academics in the youth of Germany.102 By 1938, at least 1.5 million of 
the 8.7 million Hitler Youth members were trained in rifle shooting.103 Along with the 
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compulsory service in the Hitler Youth, the increase in paramilitary training for German 
youth ensured the Reich had a substantial pool of soldiers for action in the next war. 
From the beginning of World War II, Hitler Youth members were mobilized for the war 
effort. Some acted as couriers, while other manned anti-aircraft batteries.104 A key 
example of the role the Hitler Youth played in World War II is seen in the 12
th
 SS-Panzer 
Division Hitlerjungend, a special division comprised of 17–18 year old boys (and 
sometimes younger) that prepared to go to battle. This division saw action in June 1944, 
attacking and destroying many Canadian tanks while taking many loses. Over the month 
of June, 60 percent of its members were killed, missing, or wounded.105 Its final stand 
came in September, when the remains of the division were destroyed in its retreat from 
the Normandy campaign. This is just an example of the sacrifice the Hitler Youth made 
during the war. Many other children were killed or wounded during the war while serving 
in direct and support roles. As the war progressed, younger and younger children were 
recruited into direct combat, with some as young as 12 manning posts during the final 
stand in Berlin as Hitler committed suicide and ended Nazi control of Germany.106 
B. STURMABTEILUNG 
The SA was originally founded in 1921 by Adolf Hitler as a paramilitary 
organization and strong-arm wing of the Nazi Party.107 Throughout the 1920s, Hitler 
maintained his view that, should the Nazis come to power that the SA should remain an 
auxiliary to the German Army, while such high officials in the SA as Ernst Röhm, 
believed it should form the vanguard of a new people’s army. At the beginning on 1931, 
Ernst Röhm took over as Chief of Staff of the SA and almost immediately started to plan 
the folding of the SA into the Army without the knowledge of Hitler. He reorganized the 
SA to parallel the army, and made secret deals with General Kurt von Schleicher that 
would have the SA fall under German Army control in the case of a communist 
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uprising.108 The SA continued to grow in the early 1930s, with the exception of a short 
period in 1932 when the SA was dissolved as part of a plan by von Schleicher to force 
Brüning and Groener out of the government.109 Röhm had built an organization of over 
one and a half million men by January 1933 and set it up to be the future army under 
Nazi rule. By the spring of 1934, the SA had grown to about 4.5 million men.110 Hitler 
did not completely agree with Röhm and his plans for the SA. Hitler preferred to 
maintain a good relationship with the army, as it may prove useful as he gained more 
power after the 1932 elections and became Chancellor. As Hitler concentrated on his role 
as Chancellor, Röhm continued to win over the loyalty of the SA, causing a crisis for 
Hitler. As John Wheeler-Bennett pointed out: 
The SA were indeed rapidly establishing within the Party the position of 
an imperium in imperio not dissimilar from the status which the 
Reichswehr had achieved for itself within the Weimar Republic, with the 
same potential menace to the central authority.111 
Hitler understood that the SA was gaining power and tried to ensure he was on 
good terms with the army, which would be beneficial in the case of a fallout with Röhm 
and the SA. Röhm saw the SA as the force that would lead the Nazi revolution. Over the 
course of 1933 and the beginning of 1934, Hitler and Röhm were locked in a battle over 
the future of the SA. Röhm pressed for consolidation of the army and the SA under him 
as the Minister of Defense, while Hitler maintained that the army and the paramilitary 
groups were spate and would remain so. Others within the Nazi Party saw an opportunity 
and tried to persuade Hitler to get rid of the SA. The most notable of these men was 
Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the elite SS organization. He saw a chance to move his 
organization into the void a destroyed SA would create.112 Over the first half of 1934, 
Himmler, Göring, and Werner von Blomberg, Hitler’s Minister of Defense, pressed for 
permission to exterminate the SA, namely some key figures in its ranks. Finally on June 
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21, 1934, Hitler agreed to the plan to remove the SA from its position of power and over 
the next week or so; the SS, led by Himmler, began preparing for three days of purges.113 
1. The Night of the Long Knives 1934 
In the early morning of June 30, 1934, Hitler, accompanied by Joseph Goebbels, 
the Propaganda Minister; Victor Lutze, Röhm’s successor in the SA; Wilhelm Brückner, 
Hitler’s adjutant; Emil Maurice, an SS officer and close friend of Hitler; Josef Dietrich, 
commander of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler; and other SS troops descended on 
Hotel Hanselbauer in Bad Wiessee, where Röhm and his followers were staying. Hitler 
himself conducted many of the arrests at the hotel. Röhm, Julius Uhl, an SA leader, as 
well as other senior SA officials were arrested and transported to the Stadelheim Prison in 
Munich.114 Along the way, the convoy intercepted and arrested Peter von Heydebreck, a 
SA leader, along with others who were on their way to meet with Röhm in Bad Wiessee. 
Once they reached Munich, the convoy stopped at the train station to await a train from 
Berlin carrying many SA members. Again the SS arrested several SA leaders, including 
Fritz von Krausser, Hans Hayn, and Georg von Detten among many others.115  
a. Colibrí 
It was barley 10 o’clock in the morning on June 30, a mere three and a half hours 
after the arrests at Hotel Hanselbauer, when Hermann Göring, a high ranking Nazi 
official and founder of the Gestapo, and Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Gestapo, 
received a call from Goebbels consisting of just three syllables, Colibrí. This set off a 
series of murders and arrests across Germany that would eventually leave an estimated 
150–200 people dead, including General von Schleicher, Herbert von Bose and Edgar 
Jung (both close associates of von Papen), Erich Klausener (director of the organization 
Catholic Action), and Gustav Ritter von Kahr (who prevented the Beer Hall Putsch in 
1923).116 Most of the names slated for killing by the SS were contained in sealed 
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envelopes that were finally opened upon receipt of the order by Goebbels. Over the next 
72 hours, Gestapo agents systematically went through their lists, finding and killing those 
whose names were inside. Few were arrested, most were shot where they were found. 
Papen was only protected from execution by Göring, who knew Papen had a good 
relationship with President Hindenburg and could be useful later. These 72 hours quickly 
turn into revenge killings for Himmler, Heydrich, and Göring. Anyone who may have 
posed a threat or had wronged these men previously were hunted.117 This purge would 
mean the end of the SA’s extreme supremacy (although not the complete disappearance 
of the SA); the SS would soon take the place of power within the Nazi Party.  
2. The SA after the Purge 
After the purge in 1934, the SA was dislocated from its pinnacle of power, but it 
continued in existence in a subordinate role. After the execution of Röhm and other top 
SA leaders, Viktor Lutze took over and started an internal cleansing of the organization. 
First, members that were found morally unfit to serve were expelled. This included those 
with criminal backgrounds, adulterers, and drunks. Second, the SA force was reduced to 
a more practical size. Most members that left the SA for this reason left voluntarily to 
pursue other careers or devote time to family. This reorganization was vital in the 
survival of the SA; it allowed them to create a peacetime structure for the organization. 
Bruce Campbell recognized the effect these changes had on the SA when he stated, 
“These changes were quite successful on the whole, and it may even be said that the SA 
was able to develop much more of a homogeneous corps of leaders than the more 
glamorous (and amorphous) SS ever did.”118 The SA remained relatively quiet in the first 
few years after the purge and reorganization. By 1937, the German army had grown past 
the Versailles Treaty limits and SA members were serving in the expanding German 
Army. In 1939, Hitler decided to use the SA as the source of pre- and post-military 
training required for all German men. The SA finally had a renewed purpose for 
existence. At the onset of World War II, many SA members, especially the leadership, 
                                                 
117 Gallo, The Night of Long Knives, 231. 
118 Bruce B. Campbell, “The SA after the Rohm Purge,” Journal of Contemporary History 28, no. 4 
(1993), 661. 
 49 
joined the army. The SA was also instrumental in conducting auxiliary support for the 
war. From providing equipment, guards, inspections, and prisoner transportation and 
interrogation, the SA proved essential in the German war effort.119 Along with the war 
support, the SA existed to support the Nazi party and to, as Campbell stated, “perform all 
those tasks related to the seizure and preservation of power that traditionally-conceived 
political parties and state regimes could not do or could do only with considerable 
difficulty in their conventional forms.”120 The SA was used to demonstrate the power of 
the party and to continue to push the ideals of the Nazi Party to the masses. This role 
would continue up until the demise of the Third Reich and its associated paramilitary 
organizations.  
C. SCHUTZSTAFFEL 1934  
1. Heinrich Himmler 
Born into humble beginnings, Heinrich, the son of Gebhard and Anna, a school 
teacher and the daughter of wealthy merchants, would grow up to be one of the most 
villainous figures in the Third Reich.121 From the beginning, Heinrich was obsessed with 
warfare; he read the latest telegrams and newspapers throughout World War I with awe at 
the mass mobilization that occurred. He went through officer training towards the end of 
the war, but the war ended before he could complete his training. This led to a feeling 
that, as Peter Longerich describes as “the view that he had been prevented from following 
his true calling, that of an officer.”122 After the war, Himmler, attended university, where 
he studied agriculture and joined a fencing fraternity, as well as a reserve army unit. 
 In 1923, Himmler joined the Nazi Party, and held many posts within the party 
over the years, including leader of the party office in Lower Bavaria. He joined the SS in 
1925 and quickly rose to Deputy Reichsführer-SS in 1927. This was followed with his 
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appointment as Reichsführer-SS in 1929.123 At the onset of the Third Reich, Himmler 
commanded nearly 100,000 SS members and more than 200,000 by 1934. The small 
force created to protect Hitler had grown into a substantial organization with great 
speed.124 This required a reorganization of the SS, which Himmler undertook over the 
coming years.  
He created three distinct sections of the SS: “the SS-Verfügungstruppe, consisting 
of the armed political squads including the Leibstandarte; the SS concentration camp 
guards; and the General SS, to which all other members of the SS belonged.”125 Along 
with creating the different sections of the SS, Himmler reorganized the SS headquarters; 
he created new offices for the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS intelligence organization; 
the SS office; and the Race and Settlement office. Even with all of these changes at his 
headquarters, Himmler’s main focus was maintaining control over the concentration 
camps.126 After the purges in June 1934, Himmler acquired more control of the 
concentration camps, replacing the SA guards with his SS men.  
One change Himmler brought to the SS was the transformation of it into a cult-
like organization, complete with certain rituals and rules. For example, in order to marry 
(which all SS men between 25 and 30 were expected to do), proof of the Aryan 
background of both the man and woman was required, as well as a picture of both in their 
swim suits. After this is complete, Himmler or one of his subordinates would decide if 
the couple qualified for marriage in order to produce acceptable offspring.127 Himmler 
even created special marriage ceremonies for SS weddings. This was not an ordinary 
Christian wedding, as Himmler was anti-Christianity. Children born of SS members did 
not have a traditional baptism, but rather a name consecration held by an SS official. It 
consisted of reciting passages from Mein Kampf and presentation of gifts to the child.128 
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Along with the rituals, a strict set of requirements for new members was instituted. Like 
with marriage, the prospective member had to prove that they possessed no Jewish blood 
back to 1800 or 1750 for officer candidates. After this, they had to possess three criteria 
to move on to the next phase of acceptance. These were, as Graber described: “They must 
have the correct racial appearance, their physical condition must be such as to satisfy the 
SS medical inspectors, and their ‘general bearing’ must be satisfactory.”129 After the 
candidate passes these requirements, more tests were conducted before he would take the 
oath and become an SS member.  
Himmler had a grand strategy of creating a great German empire that would be 
racially pure. With the outbreak of World War II, Hitler’s plan was to use the SS to get 
rid of the Jews, whom he saw as the source of all problems, and to resettle Germans on to 
the newly acquired lands.130 In August 1939, Himmler, after receiving orders from 
Hitler, prepared his SS men for war with Poland. There they were to act brutally, killing 
any armed men on the spot. The goal was to make room for ethnic Germans in the 
expanding German Empire. 131 He pursued the ultimate objective of Germanizing the 
empire, that is, turning the whole of Europe into a master race of Aryan Germans.  
In addition to the Germanization aims, Himmler set out to expand the Waffen-SS 
during World War II and use them to purge inferior races from the German empire. It 
was Himmler, who in 1941, pushed for the complete extermination of Jews in the eastern 
territories taken over by Germany. Through 1942, Himmler played a key role in 
furthering the Holocaust by taking over key jobs that allowed him complete control over 
all aspects of the Jewish problem. Longerich outlined the steps Himmler took to assert 
control: 
He took over responsibility for ‘combating bandits’ [insurgents] in the 
occupied territories, had a complete settlement plan drawn up for the 
territory under German domination, constantly expanded the Waffen-SS’s 
recruitment opportunities, concerned himself with the integration of the 
‘Germanic countries’ into the new Reich, planned to build up his own 
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arms business, tackled the systematic removal of ‘asocial’ elements, and, 
under the banner of ‘extermination through labour,” ensured the expansion 
of the concentration-camp system.132 
Himmler had built himself an empire within the greater German empire, free to do as he 
pleased within Hitler’s ultimate goals for Germany.  
On July 20, 1944, an attempt was made on Hitler’s life by a group of German 
army officers. After the failed assassination attempt, Himmler formed a commission that 
led to the arrest of over 5,000 people and the execution of over 4,900 people. One of 
those implicated in the assassination attempt was General Friedrich Fromm, the 
commander of the Reserve Army. Hitler dismissed Fromm and named Himmler as his 
replacement. Himmler merged the Reserve Army recruitment with that of the Waffen-SS, 
leading to an increase in the numbers in the Waffen-SS.133 As the war was coming to an 
end, Hitler had Himmler create the Volkssturm, a last-ditch militia that enlisted all men 
between the ages of 16 and 60. These men were poorly equipped and trained, leading to 
the death of many in the final months of the war.134 In January 1945, Himmler was 
involved in two operations in the war, both failures. First, he was in charge of Army 
Group Upper Rhine during Operation North Wind, the German’s attempt at penetrating 
the U.S. and French lines on the Western Front. After that failed, Himmler was sent to the 
Eastern Front to launch a counter-offensive to stop the Soviet advances. The failure on 
the Eastern Front caused Hitler to remove Himmler from command.135 
As Himmler fell out of standing with Hitler after his dismissal and with the end of 
the war imminent, Himmler sought to protect himself. He attempted to pursue peace 
negotiations himself through the Swedish Red Cross and the World Jewish Congress. 
After these discussions, about 20,000 people were released from concentration camps on 
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Himmler’s orders.136 On April 28, Hitler found out about the negotiations Himmler was 
undertaking and, on April 29, in his last will and testament, removed all party and state 
offices from Himmler, expelled him from the Nazi Party, and stated he was the most 
treacherous man he had known.137 This would effectively end Himmler’s control over the 
SS. His saga would end on May 23, 1945 when, after his capture, Himmler bit down on a 
cyanide capsule hidden in his mouth and was later buried in an unmarked grave.138 
2. The SS
The SS, although like many of the paramilitary organizations after World War I 
can draw its beginnings to the Freikorps units and storm troops of the war, can see its true 
foundation emerge in March 1923. With frequent coups and insurgencies prior to 1933, 
Adolf Hitler had become uneasy towards the SA, which was too large to be controlled, 
and recognized the need for his own protection force. He first created the Stabswache, a 
group of a few men that swore complete loyalty to Hitler. Later that year, Hitler formed 
the ‘Stosstrupp Adolf Hitler’ after the members of the Stabswache were pulled back into 
the SA organization. After the failed Beer Hall Putsch and Hitler’s imprisonment in 1924, 
the unit was disbanded. After Hitler’s release from prison in 1925, he formed a new 
bodyguard that would called the Shutzstaffel, the SS for short.139 At this time, the SS still 
fell under the purview of the SA. 
In 1929, Heinrich Himmler was placed in charge of the SS and the small number 
of men that it consisted of at the time. Himmler did not want the SS to remain a small, 
insignificant force and thus set out to slowly build its numbers to avoid suspicion by the 
SA leadership. By 1930, he had grown the SS from a force of only 280 men to nearly 
2,000, and, by October 1931, that number would be over 10,000.140 As the SS grew, its 
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mission shifted from guarding Hitler to becoming the police force for the Nazi Party. As 
the SS and SA grew, an internal strife between the two organizations emerged. In late 
1930 and again in the spring of 1931, SA and SS members clashed, leading to the 
replacing of Franz Pfeffer von Salomon as head of the SA with Röhm.141 Röhm set off to 
ensure the SA remained above the SS, but Himmler saw his organization as the elite of 
the two groups. The SS sought out only the best men, mostly from upper-middle class or 
above instead of the lower-middle and working classes like the SA.142 Due to the elite 
nature of the SS, and the smaller, more manageable nature of the organization, Hitler 
trusted them and held them in high standing. This proved useful in the expansion of the 
organization and especially with the undertaking of the purge discussed previously.  
The SS would soon become a behemoth of an organization; what started as a 
small elite group soon grew into a mass of hundreds of thousands with a large 
bureaucratic organization. The basic SS organization was as of 1934 known as the 
Allgemeine SS, or General SS, which by 1939, had about 250,000 men.143 This was the 
pool of men that could be used as needed, and during the war, most were called up to the 
SS Verfuegungstruppe and the SS Totenkopfverbaende—later known as the Waffen SS. 
By the end of the war, there were barely 40,000 General SS members. Three other 
branches of the SS, the security service, police, and Waffen SS absorbed many SS men 
and grew while the general SS shrank. The security service, the SD, was established by 
Himmler prior to 1933, but it grew rapidly in the years 1933-39. The police consisted of 
regular and security police, with the regular police split into national, rural, and local 
police, and the security police split into criminal and secret police (Gestapo). Himmler 
then put control of the SD and secret police forces under his control with the formation of 
the Main Office of Reich Security (RHSA) in 1939. Even at its peak, the RSHA had only 
70,000 men.144 Finally, the Waffen-SS, was the Nazi armed force to conduct whatever 
operations Hitler deemed necessary. The Waffen-SS is where the majority of the General 
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SS would end up. Within the Waffen-SS, the SS Totenkopfverbände, the SS Death’s 
Head detachments were initially formed in the course of 1934-35 to guard the 
concentration camps.145 
These guard detachments began in 1933, with the appointment of Theodor Eicke 
as the commandant of the concentration camp at Dachau. This man and this locale 
became the base for this paramilitary branch within the SS of a most aggressive kind. He 
overhauled the guard units at the concentration camp, implementing a new code of 
conduct for the guards and punishments for the prisoners. His guards were indoctrinated 
in the belief that, as Charles Sydnor explained, “each prisoner be treated with fanatical 
hatred as enemy of the State.”146 After his success at Dachau, Eicke moved to 
Oranienburg/Berlin and took the post of inspector of concentration camps in order to 
organize and all concentration camps under the SS flag. He started by closing many 
smaller camps and opening a few large camps to consolidate prisoners. By 1937, all the 
smaller camps were closed and Eicke had four huge camps under his control with a fifth 
built in 1938.147 His Death’s Head men ran these concentration camps, and because of 
this, they were expected to be the most elite and toughest of the SS and any that did not 
meet this standard was sent back to the General SS. Training for members was conducted 
three weeks a month, which consisted of military as well as political training. This turned 
the Death’s Head men into political fanatics; they were pure Nazi’s just as Eicke wanted. 
Following their training they guarded the concentration camps for a week before going 
back to training.148 When war broke out, the Death’s Head detachments were morphed 
into Death’s Head divisions under the Waffen-SS, leaving the concentration camps to the 
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were no more, but the new divisions did perform well in their new roles and was 
characterized by a ferocious brutality visible in the Polish and French campaigns, to say 
nothing of the Russian campaign.149 
3. Reinhard Heydrich
Reinhard Heydrich was born into a financially well-off musician family in the 
spring of 1904. His childhood was strict; his parents ran a tough house, ensuring 
education in both school and church, as well as participation in sports. As a result, 
Heydrich excelled in school, especially in the sciences.150 Like many other children at the 
time, Heydrich was stuck at an age where he could do nothing but watch as World War I 
raged on. Heydrich’s first taste of paramilitary activity came in 1919 when the 
revolutionary wave made its way to his hometown. Maercker’s Rifles came in to 
recapture the town and once this was accomplished, he set up a Civil Guard unit to 
maintain peace and security, which Heydrich joined.151 After his brief stint in Maercker’s 
Rifles, Heydrich joined the navy in 1922. He did well in the navy and only ran into a 
problem after he met a woman. Lina von Osten, a Nazi and anti-Semite, stole Heydrich’s 
heart and, after a short time, they were engaged. Heydrich’s problem was that he was 
potentially engaged to another woman with whom he had a relationship previously. This 
woman filed a complaint with the head of the navy, which led the Heydrich’s dismissal 
from the navy in 1931.152  
Owing to the set of circumstances that fell on Heydrich, he was in search of a new 
job. The economy had imploded and Heydrich was struggling. Through some family 
connections, Heydrich found himself working for Himmler on the staff of the SS. This 
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was not out of a strong tie to Nazism, but rather as a way to get back in uniform.153 So in 
June 1931, Heydrich started down the path that would have history see him as Hitler’s 
hangman, one of Germany’s greatest villains.  
Himmler saw potential in Heydrich, especially when it came to the formation of a 
SS intelligence organization. In August 1931, Himmler put Heydrich in charge of 
developing a SS intelligence service, later known as the SD. Heydrich quickly rose to the 
rank of SS-Sturmbannführer (major) in 15 months.154 In March of 1933, after the Nazi 
takeover of Germany, Heydrich was appointed as the head of the Bavarian Political 
Police. In this new role, he used the concentration camps to stash his detainees for as long 
as he wanted without need for a trial.155 In 1934, Heydrich, with Himmler’s help, was 
made the head of the Gestapo office in Berlin. After this appointment, Heydrich turned 
his eyes toward the SA, which was gaining power. His SD department provided names to 
the SS of SA leaders who were to be killed in the purge at the end of June. His Gestapo 
men were instrumental in that event, carrying out most of the arrests and murders.156 
When Himmler took over the German police in 1936, Heydrich acquired more men in his 
Gestapo organization. As the Gestapo and SD grew, a division of labor had to take place 
to ensure both had specific roles and to avoid overlapping responsibilities. Heydrich had 
the SD run all the large picture state security problems and the Gestapo would be the 
muscle for the SD.157  
Heydrich started addressing the Jewish problem in 1935 with measures introduced 
that put all returning émigrés in concentration camps, as well as keeping track of all Jews 
living in Germany. In 1936, Heydrich was put in charge of the Foreign Currency 
Investigation Agency, which gave him the tools to persecute Jews economically if he felt 
the violated foreign currency regulations. Heydrich was instrumental in the organization 
of Kristallnacht, a pogrom against Jews in Germany and Austria over November 8–9, 
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1938. Kristallnacht resulted in 91 deaths, 30,000 Jews being sent to concentration camps, 
and thousands of Jewish businesses, houses, and synagogues destroyed.158  
When Hitler decided to invade Poland, he tapped Heydrich’s Gestapo and SD 
forces to hunt out potential resistance and destroy them. The SD then developed a list of 
61,000 Poles that would be killed or arrested immediately.159 During the invasion of 
Poland, Heydrich was tasked with forming the Einsatzgruppen (task forces) that followed 
behind the army and rounded up Jews to be sent to ghettos.160 As Germany began its 
Soviet campaign in 1941, the Einsatzgruppen conducted indiscriminate killing of Soviet 
Jews. By the end of the year, at least 500,000 Jews were murdered, most shot at close 
quarters. Heydrich was worried that the face-to-face killings would be bad for his men, so 
he set out to find a better way to conduct mass killings. He settled on Zyklon B, a 
chemical fumigant that was initially tested at Auschwitz.161 After 1941, Jews began to be 
sent to concentration camps for the expressed reason to either work until they die or be 
gassed.  
Heydrich was just getting started on the master plan to rid Europe of inferior races 
when he was assassinated. On May 27, 1942, a few Czech soldiers set up along 
Heydrich’s route and attacked his car as it approached. Heydrich was shot and died nine 
days later at a hospital in Prague.162 After his death, Hitler ordered reprisals for 
Heydrich’s killing, specifically the total destruction of Lidice, the village where the 
killers were thought to be hiding. All men were to be killed and the women sent to 
concentration camps.163 Retaliation continued for months, with thousands arrested or 
killed as a result of Heydrich’s death. Although the majority of Jewish deaths occurred 
after Heydrich’s death, he was instrumental in the organization and management of the 
forces that would carry out the horrendous acts over the next few years.  
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4. Waffen-SS 
The beginnings of the Waffen-SS can be traced to the beginning of Hitler’s reign 
in 1933. Hitler created “Political Purpose Squads” within the SS as well as the Death’s 
Head detachments that would merge into the Waffen-SS later in the course of 1939/40. 
Eicke’s men, along with other smaller armed SS groups, were the executors of the purge 
on June 30, 1934 and would pave the way for a growth in armed SS men.164 After this, 
Hitler called for the organization of the SS Verfügungstruppe, an armed unit that would 
be part of a larger SS division and whose role was the suppression of a 1918 style revolt 
at home or abroad. The SS Verfügungstruppe, along with the Death’s Head detachments, 
formed the nucleus of the armed SS, with the former being the more military of the two. 
At the outbreak of war in 1939, there were only eight to nine thousand armed SS 
members, but that would quickly change.165 By 1940, the Waffen-SS had three divisions, 
including the Death’s Head division, but still fought for recognition and men. Finally in 
March 1940, the title of Waffen-SS became the official name for the armed SS.166 The 
Waffen-SS was enjoying a rapid recruiting surge, having more than 125,000 men ready 
to support the army in its offensive in the west in mid-1940. The Waffen-SS performed 
well on the western front in 1940, keeping up with the army, although losing more men 
due to reckless nature of the units. They were trained to not fear death and were lacking 
in real military training, leading to the unnecessary deaths of many of its soldiers.167  
After action on both the western and eastern fronts, the SS continued to expand, 
with new divisions added in 1942. New tank battalions were ordered as the army and SS 
were entrenched in a brutal battle with Russia. The numbers within the Waffen-SS also 
expanded significantly in 1942 and 1943. From a force of under 200,000 in September 
1942, it grew to over 350,000 by the fall of 1943.168 As 1943 came to end, the Waffen-SS 
was being sent from battle to battle, backing up the army where it was weak. Through 
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1943 and 1944, Waffen-SS units were on all fronts, from Italy to the Soviet Union, 
fighting defensives battles that would test the strongest of military units. After failures on 
all sides, the Waffen-SS prepared for the final offensive push in the west.169 
The German army, along with the Waffen-SS, made two last ditch efforts on the 
western front in the closing months of 1944 and into 1945. First, Hitler threw 20 army 
divisions, led by four SS divisions into battle in the Ardennes. This offensive was a 
failure and the German troops were stuck after their initial assault stalled. To help this, 
Hitler tried a second offensive in Alsace consisting of eight divisions led by a SS 
division. Again, this offensive failed and would mark the end of attempts to penetrate the 
western front.170 In Berlin, the SS did not stand a chance up against the Allied advances. 
There were practically no divisions left to hold the city and those left in Berlin were 
crushed. This would spell the end of the Waffen-SS, a force that started from humble 
beginnings but had amassed a force of 600,000 men at its peak. The Waffen-SS was a 
strong force, but still not as strong as Himmler had wanted. The army still had control of 
resources and leadership of the fighting force. The Waffen-SS had ventured far from its 
initial job of defending Hitler and serving as the Nazi police and into the realm of full 
combat against state armies.171  
D. VOLKSSTURM  
The Volkssturm was simply Hitler’s last ditch effort at saving Germany after a 
string a bitter defeats on both fronts in the last months of World War II. It was founded 
on September 25, 1944 and called for the conscription of all men aged 16 to 60 to fight. It 
was assigned to Nazi Party over the army for one main reason; Hitler knew that in order 
for the Volkssturm to be successful, they would have to want to fight instead of being 
forced to fight. He believed the Nazi Party could accomplish this over the army, which 
had failed in battle recently.172 Initially, this was a success; the men had good morale and 
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went into battle willingly. Armed with minimal military training, the Volkssturm men 
originally performed support roles such as security, labor, and building defenses. When 
called upon to support the defense of the eastern front, the Volkssturm had some minor 
successes, but was ultimately unsuccessful and paid dearly, with losses over 35 
percent.173 On the western front the story is similar; the men lost the will to fight and 
many were killed or captured. They were armed poorly, had poor weapons, and little 
support. There were not enough weapons to arm everyone effectively due to the millions 
of men in the Volkssturm. This resulted in desertions and a lack of effort by many 
units.174 Finally, in the battle for Berlin, the Volkssturm had some men, but the Allied 
forces were too much for the German forces, including the Volkssturm, and they were 
quickly overrun. In the end, the Volkssturm was ultimately a failure due to the lack of 
preparation the Nazi Party allocated to it. They were unsuccessful at outfitting and 
training the force because of the hasty formation of the Volkssturm, leading to its many 
defeats.175 The process from defeat and irregular military formation imbued with 
fanatical political purpose had gone in a quarter of a century from a violent birth to an 
even more violent and horrible death. The second instance had shown the original 
destructive energy of such a union of irregular and paramilitary spirit with military 
nihilism. The latter had gotten a grip on the levers of state power and the European 
system with horrific results. The upshot had damaged the professional ideals of soldiers 
and demonstrated the weaknesses of democracy in a most frightful manner.  
E. THE HOLOCAUST 
Initially, the Jewish problem was solved by forced relocation to Jewish 
settlements, where, although many died due to starvation and illness, they were not 
systematically exterminated as they were after 1941. In the interim between 1939 and 
1941, Jews were sent to the concentration camps to be held until deportation.176 This 
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allowed the Nazi regime to monitor the Jews and prepare them for expulsion from 
Germany, which was seeking to become a judenfrei (free of Jews) state. After the failure 
of Germany to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941, the Nazi regime faced a growing Jewish 
problem. Hitler had intended to save the deportations until after the war, but he changed 
his mind just prior to the end of the offensive operations in the Soviet Union. After this, 
he was committed to the final solution, the complete extermination of all the Jews in 
Europe. After the assassination of Heydrich, Operation Reinhard was launched with the 
objective of murdering all Jews in the General Government, an occupied area in Poland. 
Nearly 1.7 million Jews were killed in this operation.177 These murders would soon 
expand to the rest of the German controller territories, using the concentration camps and 
killing centers at Auschwitz, Chelmno, and Belzac, among others. Jews were 
systematically shot, gassed, or starved until the body count rose to over six million by the 
end of the war.178 The holocaust shows how far the paramilitary arm of the Nazi Party 
had risen; it started as a small bodyguard force and would morph into a massive 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Starting with the veteran’s organizations following the Franco-Prussian War, 
paramilitary organizations have been assertive in their influence on German politics and 
society. In the lead-up to World War I, youth organizations emerged that instilled a 
revolutionary ideology that was prevalent in early paramilitary groups. As the war began 
and intensified, a new type of solider developed. The stormtrooper was an elite fighting 
man and formed into units that were drastically different than the regular army. This 
would lay the groundwork for the post-war paramilitary units. As the war came to a 
close, demands by the Allies would, unbeknownst to them, start Germany down a road of 
increasing paramilitary and ideological growth.  
The Treaty of Versailles set limits on the German army that were unrealistic and 
would cause Germany to create other organizations to cover the gaps the army left behind 
due to the limited force. Along with the limited manpower allocated to the army, the 
hundreds of thousands of returning veterans were met with no jobs, since their only 
known profession, the military, was unable to accommodate them. This led to the 
formation of paramilitary organizations that allowed these veterans to continue their 
profession without the help of the army. Along with veterans, the youth that was too 
young to join the war effort, but old enough to want to, flocked to these new Freikorps 
units to get a taste of military life.  
Many new Freikorps units sprouted up after the end of the war, and many of these 
took part in Sparticist week, a communist and independent uprising in Berlin that was 
defeated by many Freikorps units. After this, Freikorps units continued crushing leftist 
uprisings until the Treaty of Versailles forced the dissolution of many of these units. This 
led to the failed Kapp Putsch in 1920 that saw some of the Freikorps units taking Berlin 
and attempting to set up a new government. After this failure, the Freikorps units that had 
enjoyed the governments support previously were forced to operate underground, as they 
had all been disbanded.  
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The underground paramilitary movement continued for several years, with the 
groups taking on new identities to avoid problems with the government. During these 
years (1921–1923), political paramilitary groups emerged, particularly those of the 
communists and national socialists. After the failed beer hall putsch in 1923 by Hitler and 
his SA, paramilitary organizations lessened their military emphasis and focused more on 
the political. These new political combat leagues influenced politics with less violence 
than the previous paramilitary organizations. The SA, left in shambles after the failed 
putsch and imprisonment of their leader, was resurrected by Röhm and further 
strengthened after Hitler’s release from prison in 1925.  
After Hitler’s Nazi Party took power in 1933, the SA and SS no longer took a 
back seat to politics and violence. Rather, these violent organizations became central to 
the Nazi state with the paramilitary ethos. These organizations were now the violent arm 
of the leading political party in Germany. In the Third Reich, paramilitary organizations 
prevailed, as long as they were named the HJ, SA, or SS. The Hitler Youth provided a 
breeding ground for future SA and SS members, indoctrinating German youth in Nazi 
ideology and military training. The SA quickly became the prevalent paramilitary force 
in Germany after 1933, growing rapidly through 1933–34. This rapid growth, along with 
disagreements between Hitler and Röhm over the direction of the SA led to Hitler’s 
distrust of the organization. This ultimately led to the Night of the Long Knives in June 
and July of 1934, which saw the SA dismantled from the top and pushing the SS to the 
prominent position in the Nazi Party.  
The SS, led by Himmler, became the face of mass and technocratic state violence 
and terror in Germany. They ran the secret police, as well as the concentration camps, 
which saw millions of people killed. Himmler transformed the SS from a small group of 
bodyguards into a state within a state of elite fighters that saw combat in World War II, as 
well as running the complex concentration camp system throughout the Reich. Heydrich 
and Eicke took the concentration camps and turned them into effective killing grounds 
and turned its guards into the elite of the SS. His forces, along with the other armed SS 
members that would make up the Waffen-SS, proved itself in battle, although they were 
ultimately defeated by the Allies at a huge cost in life for Germany and its neighbors.  
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This paramilitary explosion of violence and state terror in Germany saw after 
World War I hinged on a few main points. First, the inherent revolutionary spirit in 
Germany allowed the paramilitary mindset to take hold easier once it was underway. 
Second, the Treaty of Versailles set up an impossible situation for Germany. The state 
was unable to sustain security and stability without an adequate military apparatus and 
was forced to turn to the paramilitary units formed in the post-war environment. Once 
underway, it was impossible to stop the paramilitary groups from expanding, regardless if 
they were deemed illegal or not. The members of these units became more politicalized, 
eventually making their voices seen in the government, sometimes with violence. With 
the Allies refusing to lessen the blow to the German army, paramilitary organizations 
grew and occupied an increasingly powerful position within the state, eventually leading 
to the rise of the Nazi Party and the SA/SS violence that followed.  
A lesson can be learned from the events that took place in Germany after World 
War I and into World War II. War termination is a delicate art form; the victors must 
ensure that the enemy does not have the power to go to war again, but they must also 
ensure that it has the ability to be a stable nation. This power can be found in the 
personality and collective personalities of the demobilized soldier and or those who 
aspire to join the ranks of soldiers in the wake of defeat. In the case of war termination 
after War World I, the Allies failed on both accounts because they were focused more on 
the punitive means to ensure that Germany could not fight in the future with the physical 
punishment of disarmament, instead of the more arduous task of building a stable and 
effective democratic state and an army in a democracy in this state. Although today is not 
1923, it is important to give careful consideration to the implications of any demands 
placed on another state at the end of a conflict and to be alert to the rise of the 
paramilitary complex amid the democratic crisis in Europe. These factors are once more 
in playas of this writing in 2014 in such places as Greece, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia, 
and collide with an extraordinary ignorance about the forces of violence that exist in 
poisoned mass politics and ruptured military professionalism. The Allies in 1919 failed to 
factor in the requirements needed for Germany to ensure its security from within and 
placed limitations that allowed revolutionary groups to form and take over the nation. 
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The story of the paramilitary rupture of German politics, which led to an attempt to 
overwhelm the European system of state, is a story that any expert on European defense 
and security needs to know.  In the future, the makers of strategy and operations should 
devote more attention to all aspects of war termination, especially the internal impact on 
any limitations, to prevent another catastrophe like the world saw in the first half of the 
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